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Abstract
Boko Haram (BH) insurgency is driven by Islamist ideology and hegemony, nurtured
mainly on failed education and sociopolitical policies and less by economic realities in
Nigeria. Military counterinsurgency (hard COIN) successes are necessary but not
sufficient to neutralize resurgence. The framework for this study was premised on
behavior modification by targeted holistic education policy (THEP) over ruminated
frustration-aggression of drive theory. The purpose of this cross-sectional study was to
conduct a survey of educated participants (N = 95), randomly selected from education
campuses in Nigeria, to estimate the power (relationship) of THEP over time to neutralize
BH resurgence (NBHR). The data from a survey developed for this study were analyzed
with descriptive, ANOVA, ANCOVA, and MANCOVA statistics. The powers of THEP
applied from nursery through college (age 21) to NBHR or reduce (dry up) the foot
soldiers’ recruitment pools (FSRP) and correlations were evaluated. All 7 regression
models rejected the null hypotheses. THEP and covariables including illiteracy (IL),
political conspiracy (PC) or Islamic hegemony (IH), religious extremism (RE), and
economic realities (ER) were related to NBHR. PC correlated inversely with THEP and
IL inversely with reducing (drying up) FSRP. ER had the least impetus (power) to drive
resurgence. The results of this study can be used to promote positive social change by
providing information on the prospects (estimated power) of THEP, acting with other
COIN measures, to NBHR. The study may contribute to a better understanding of the
impetus and solution to BH resurgence, but calls for further investigation into the power
of nonmilitary COIN, particularly THEP, in Nigeria.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
To neutralize and prevent the resurgence of the Nigerian Boko Haram (BH)
insurgency, policymakers must understand and address the root causes, motivations, and
impetuses to the resurgence power. Scholars have portrayed the BH insurgency as rooted
in the global terrorism of ideological Islamist fundamentalism. Forest (2012) noted that
ideology is difficult to isolate, defeat, or to eradicate from other contributory causes. It
will take years, perhaps generations, to neutralize an ideology. Alkhouri (2014) suggested
a counterideology, or counternarrative, that is more peaceful. In Far East Asia, East
Europe, Africa, and terrorism in the West, strategies in combating terrorism or fighting
counterinsurgency (COIN) wars, and the limitations of military violence, have been
learned (Campbell & Bunche, 2011). Counterinsurgency (COIN) has been defined as
“the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by
a government to defeat an insurgency” (The US Joint Publication, 2004, p. 1-2). In this
study, I focused on what neutralizes the resurgence commonly associated with
ideological impetuses for violence (religious, political, ethnological, or economic) and a
defeated insurgency. In a treatise on COIN warfare across three continents (Africa, Asia,
and Europe), Galula (1964) pointed out that successful insurgency is predicated on
welcoming opportunities, such as weak COIN, congenial host, and an outside support
before and after the insurgency. Vrooman (2005) and Burke, Few & Prine (2011)
challenged Galula’s theories. However, Galula argued that the danger of insurgency will
persist as long as the problem that produced it endures.
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Taylor (2012) proffered that to defeat an insurgency, the institutional army must
use some transformational strategy, or a synergistic approach and radical change in
doctrine, training, materiel, organization, and leadership that employs the whole power of
government to break the cycle of violence and to achieve stability in the zone of crisis.
Drew (1988) suggested more studies on nonlinear warfare, a force structure that
integrates military, political, and economic strategies. In this study, I assessed the
effectiveness of one component in the structure to neutralize the resurgence of Nigerian
BH insurgency. This is a component that offers a soft preventative strategy, reflecting
one of Drew’s four doctrines: it takes a long time to implement targeted holistic
education policy (THEP) through formative years. Lutz (2014) concluded that there are
multiple ways that terrorism may end. Terrorism is related but is not the same as
insurgency (Underhill, 2014).
The hypothesis of this study was that a composite contextual holistic education
model targeted at the roots (incident population) would influence a fundamental deradicalization of the ideological discipleship that cradle the Islamist insurgency in an
agrarian Nigerian religious society. Successful prosecution of military COIN is a quick
but reactionary strategy. It rarely yields the capitulation of the ideology; rather, it
provides more opportunity for resurgence, like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS);
it yields no permanent solution to subsequent resurgence (Okeke-Uzodike & Onapajo,
2015). Because terrorism is not synonymous with insurgency (Evans & Bell, 2010),
counterterrorism differs from COIN. Terrorism strikes fear on the adversary, whereas an
insurgency fights a war to liberate from or defeat a state, an adversarial power, or
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government. Nigerian BH has morphed into a mostly Islamist religious ideological
insurgency to establish a caliphate in a northern region including parts of Cameroun,
Chad, and Niger republics.
Education deficit is high in Northern Nigeria including areas where BH is
operated (NBS, 2014). Adio (2016) argued that the lack of quality education (policy) in
the North was related to economic realities, and that insecurity was associated with the
region, the known operational base of BH insurgency. Nigerian government under
President Jonathan approved 400 model (Islamic) Almajiri schools to be built in 18 of 19
Northern states of Nigeria, of which 125 were already built by 2013 (Aghedo & Eke,
2013). This was an attempt at bringing the value of Western education (called Ilimin
Boko, or Karatun Boko) to the Qur’anic school system (called Tsangaya), and on to the
advanced theological schools (called madrasahs), Abdurrahman (2012); Orude (2013).
They were mostly of Islamic theology (Fowoyo, 2013) and were not able to neutralize the
developing culpability of violent and extreme Islamist ideology in Nigeria. Although the
Jihadi radicalization strategy extends beyond the Almajiri school system, Orude (2013)
argued that the ongoing insecurity and insurgency in the North is the price Nigeria pays
for policy failure of the continuation of Almajiri or Tsangaya education system into the
21st century, which became a radicalization and recruiting hot bed for the BH Islamist
insurgency.
In the All Progressives Congress (APC), General Muhammadu Buhari urged the
Nigerian government to provide “free and qualitative education in the country” and
particularly in the North (Vanguard News, 2014, p. 1). General Muhammadu Buhari
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argued that poor education policy is the reason for insecurity and political unrest. The
framework of this study reflected General Buhari’s argument, a COIN model. Bold,
targeted implementation of (free) holistic education policy contextually modeled and
applied within Nigerian geo-politics would be effective COIN measure to neutralize the
ideological impetus for BH resurgence. It will integrate elements of religious, Western,
vocational, and peace education with globalism, shielded by necessary security force
options. It will be free and compulsory from early childhood education through high
school and up to 2 or 4-year College. The Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Saad Abubakar called
for unfettered “unrestricted access to education for youth, to enhance peace, harmony and
progress in Nigeria” as a priority for the government (Vanguard, 2014, p. 1). Over 45
years after the end of the Nigeria-Biafra civil war, the call for a separate sovereign state
of Biafra has resurged since 2015. The impetuses for the Biafra war/agitation have not
been neutralized. They were neither religious nor ideological, compared to those for BH
insurgency. Ignorance with respect to Western education may have been costly to the
North, but an unbalanced, nonholistic, reformed Islamic education model (the Tsangaya)
appears vulnerable to the infusion of Islamist radicalism that is destabilizing the Nigerian
state (Soyinka, 2013).
Any formula to preserve the Nigerian State for mutual coexistence of its diverse
African ethnicities (over 250) is worth the study. Despite the failures of its British
colonial blueprints since the 1914 amalgamation, prospects of developing new functional,
progressive, practical, and indigenous Nigerian public policies for a peaceful social order
in the sub-Saharan African hemisphere will be enhanced by contribution to scholarship
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that this study may provide. The Nigerian Tribune editorial of October 23, 2012 noted
that the security problem presented by the Nigerian BH insurgency can be solved by
research. In this quantitative, cross-sectional random survey study of knowledgeable
participants (sociologically informed) sample field across the geo-political center of
Nigeria, I have attempted to determine the levels of expected correlation of the dependent
and independent variables by answering six research questions. I assessed the power of
targeted holistic education in neutralizing Nigerian BH resurgence.
Some Existing Conditions
Indigenous nationalities north and south of Nigeria shared adjacent precolonial
geographical space but in distinct abodes. The challenges of their societies were not the
same, although similar. There are still sociocultural and religious differences, but
significant equivalents. The sample field was target domains or clusters. The Nigerian
BH insurgency has stayed in the far Northeast and the North, in predominantly Islamic
zones. Various scholars portrayed some precursors heralding the present insurgency
outbreak (Adesoji, 2010; Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Darma, Sani, & Kankara, 2016;
Falola, 2015; Huntington, 1990; Rogers, 2012; Salawu, 2010; Ukiwo, 2003). Ukiwo
(2003) pointed to the limitations of democratic transitions where the people are usually
disappointed upon realizing that nothing has changed, resulting in violent conflicts. Ake
(2000) explained that failures of promises of redistribution and equalization of power
through democratization attracted violent reactions. However, in comparison, the “unIslamic” Southern Nigeria has not been immune to typical ethno-political violence
resulting from the trouble with Nigeria, Achebe (2000). Ake and Achebe and Ukiwo
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vindicated systemic failures that highlighted the change mantra promised by the new
President Muhammadu Buhari (2015).
There is a conflict of two dominant religions, the preexisting Islam in the North
and the new Christianity dominant in the South and North central regions. Some have
implicated a British complicity as a sense of superiority of race and civilization
(Bourdon, 1904) so that they protected the preexisting Northern Islamic Fulani Caliphate
while thwarting the northward expanse of the Christianity accepted by the Southern
aboriginal delta tribes (Taiye, 2013). The new Western-educated Southern Nigeria was
growing. A political/cultural polarization was further empowered by the differing
religious identities and ethnicities. The postindependence (1960) political progression
may have encouraged the Islamic North’s attempt of nationalization of the Islamic Sharia
Law; evidenced at the 1978 constitutional conference debates (and the Sharia-biased
1999 constitution) that still threatens the unity and secularity of the Nigerian State.
Islamic resurgences have occurred in the decades of religious violence and riots
mostly in the North (Falola, 1998). The failure of the 1980s and 1990s was demonstrated
in various governmental policies and administration goals. The radicalization of Islamic
populations north of Nigeria may correlate with the actions and reactions in recent geopolitics. The global jihadi factors took new life since the 1979 Iranian revolution. There
were the Muammar Gaddafi’s nationalism and the Islamic exploits in Libya/Africa and
the Al Qaeda terrorism on the U.S. soil in 2001. The Somalia Al Shabaab’s ongoing
terrorism prefaced the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) following the
eradication of sovereignties in Iraq. There was a clash of Western civilization and Islamic
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fundamentalism cultures. There are suspected factors of Arab-Islamic imperialism or
Arab-Muslim expansionism, called out by the Biafran leader General Ojukwu (1969). To
some, BH extremism is not Islamic and is contrary to common philosophies. This more
liberal perspective is not substantiated in current literature.
Nigeria: A Stabilizing Regional Force
In the sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria has been a stabilizing economic, military, and
political force. Nigeria had become the leading economy surpassing South Africa (Sklar,
2015). Nigeria remains the most populous African country with a population of over 170
million people of over 250 diverse ethnic groupings, and home to two major world
religions, Christianity and Islam, with a slight Christian majority of about 50.8% overall
(Omotosho, 2015). The NBS (2010) alleged a Muslim majority of 50 to Christian 40%.
Nigeria led the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group forces in
stabilizing war-torn Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali (Hamman &
Omojuwa, 2013). Nigeria was a part of the leading intervention force during the Congo
1960 wars (Kisangani, 2012). With the BH insurgency, the disintegration or
balkanization of the Nigerian State has become plausible (Omitola, 2012). A failed
Nigeria state will lead to chaos in the subregion. This chaos can lead to anarchy, human
rights abuses, international terrorism, crime, famine, and disease stemming from internal
displacements. In spite of the religious, sociocultural, and current developmental
differences in Nigeria, a (secularly) united country where respect for universal human
rights would become the rule for coexistence, and it would amount to a global new norm
in human social development.
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Ideology versus Virtue
Virtue should trump ideology regardless of other social factors. The Universal
Human Rights Declarations in 1948 by UN attested to this social norm. The threat of
disintegration of its quasi-federation is what BH resurgence portends, like Al Shabaab on
Somalia. The multiethnic nationalities prefer a just and equitable One Nigeria where
diversity, tolerance, freedom of worship, of movement, and enterprise and where
democracy and meritocracy are the rules (Forest, 2012). The majority of Nigerians reject
internal colonization or imperialism and the born-to-rule Islamic Caliphate hegemony,
systemic corruption, political inequalities, and the infestation of chronic tribalism (Forest,
2012).
BH insurgency has engaged the regional counterinsurgency of the multinational
joint task force (MNJTF) of Cameroun, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria and the global
partnerships of the United States, France, Israel, Britain, United Nations, and the African
Union combined in their Jihad (struggle) to create a purist religious caliphate of a new
Islamic State. The insurgency is equipped militarily, and it is motivated psychologically.
They have attacked churches, Mosques, and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps
and other places of noncombatant civilian assembly. They are at war with the Nigerian
State. Many Muslim groups and authorities have rejected the beliefs of BH as un-Islamic
(Olojo, 2013). The turmoil of the Middle East, the U.S. Iraqi and Afghanistan wars since
9/11 (2001), the Russian-Chechnya wars, and other similar experiences in the history of
modern insurgencies, point to the limits of a military counterinsurgency against an
ideological terrorism or resurgence war.
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Scholars have recommended education, or reeducation in peace education, in new
Almajiri schools. These models already existed; they are deployed and have been tested
in Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the Niger Delta, and in Northern Nigeria with limited and or
mixed results. The higher the literacy rate, the better the economy of the people, Nigerian
population (North and South) being a typical example, and the lower the rate of political
corruption, as voters become better educated about the issues on the ballots (NBS, 2012).
The alleged sponsors of global terrorism are not illiterate. Illiterates do not build powerful
suicide bombs (Ali, 2010; Onuoha, 2014a). In this study, targeted holistic education
policies were implemented from kindergarten through youth at high school and college.
In this study, I tested the relationship between the resurgence attitude or tendency borne
out of Nigerian public or sectarian policies of education, Islamization, membership in
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC, 1986), Sharia Law (1999), the alleged politics of
born-to-rule by Northern Nigeria Islamic Caliphate (the hegemony), economics, and
targeted holistic education. These independent factors mainly tie into religious ideology
and may have contributed to the radicalization and the insurgency of the Northern Islamic
population over time within the Nigerian polity.
Branding
BH claimed that Western education is sin (Onuoha, 2012a). BH conducted
terrorist-style attacks first on Christianity and on any symbols of Westernization, and
then on other Muslims who differed or embraced more moderate Islam (Chotia, 2012;
Cook, 2011; Forest, 2012; Onuoha, 2012a). BH was ranked the deadliest terror group in
2014 (Vanguard News, 2016), and it was publicly branded a foreign terrorist organization
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(FTO) by the US Department of State on November 13, 2013, and by the United
Kingdom, India, and other democracies. BH was officially an insurgency against the
Nigerian secular state, but has attacked targets across borders in the neighboring
Cameroun and pro-Islamic republics of both Chad and Niger. Nigeria and its regional
neighbors have mounted a MNJTF of counterinsurgency seeking to defeat the BH
insurgency, militarily. Although the BH sect has mainly declared war (or is conducting a
civil war) against the Nigerian State, it has spread to these neighbors. The focus is on
defeating the insurgency, but there was yet to be any effective strategy to neutralizing its
resurgence, or to properly reintegrating the insurgents into normal society after defeat,
besides imprisonment and the upgrading of Almajiri education system. Scholars called
BH Nigerian Taliban, terrorists, rebels, insurgents, Islamists, the northeast Caliphate, but
the sect stated that they are Jihadists fighting to Islamize Nigeria against Western
acculturation (Adesoji, 2011; Cook, 2011; Loimeier, 2012; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012).
There is an existing Islamic agenda to Islamize not just the Nigerian State but the entire
continent of Africa.
Signature Attacks, Tolls, and Resurgence
BH’s signature attacks are observable in the patterns and lethality of other terror
groups like the Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Shabaab, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic Caliphate
insurgency of ISIS (or ISIL). Attacks include suicide bombings and genocides;
destruction of Western symbolisms, churches, religious ideological oppositions including
Mosques; and the disruption of economic, political, and social order. The death toll has
exceeded 23,000 (Vanguard News, 2016). Others claim the toll is over 100,000 casualties
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(Africa Check, 2014) and is climbing as the insurgency did not abate after the new
Nigerian President Buhari came to power and vowed to defeat the insurgency by end of
2015. Before a temporary cease fire was negotiated with Nigerian and other neighboring
countries’ governments, the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) noted in 2014
that the BH insurgency had killed over 10,000 people. The number of IDPs run in
hundreds of thousands and over 2.6 million (Vanguard News, 2016) or 2.15 million
(Vanguard News, 2016).
BH allegedly has attracted regional Islamist fighters to join forces (Karmon,
2014). Global inquiries have increased since the abduction and search for the 276 Chibok
Schoolgirls, in April 2014, since they declared the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in
their conquered region and stronghold in northeastern Nigeria. In 2012, the French
intervened in the neighboring West African state of Mali where a BH counterpart terror
group, an Al-Qaeda surrogate, had previously established similar countergovernment
insurgency and terror stronghold, threatening a global terrorist safe haven. The killings
and the destruction patterns have been similar.
The BH agenda is similar to those of 2014 ISIS’s in the Syria-Iraq regions–
seeking to establish Islamic States of their purist religious fundamentalist definitions (a
Caliphate) to be governed by the strictest Islamic Sharia legal code (Adesoji, 2011;
Agbiboa, 2013a; Onuoha, 2012a). Although resilient, the insurgency continued to suffer
casualties and losses of captured territories against the regional MNJTF, the military
working with local militia, or the civilian JTF. In May 2014, the new administration in
Nigeria vowed to defeat BH insurgency by December 2015. It claimed BH was
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“technically defeated” (Vanguard News, 2015). A defeat would allow reconstruction and
the implementation of a targeted holistic education policy (THELP) in the region.
However, the Nigerian security, Department of State Services claimed that BH has
disguised as Fulani herdsmen attacking defenseless villages in Agatu, Benue state, in
Nimbo, Enugu state, in middle belt and southern Nigeria. The BH insurgency is yet to be
defeated (Gaffey, 2016). Resurgence and attacks continued. BH continues to attack the
military inflicting casualties.
Background of Study
Religious fundamentalism (ie., the rigid adherence, devotion, or orientation
towards the [original orthodox views] roots or fundaments as fixed) cuts across various
religions including Christianity (Koopmans, 2015). In Islamism, governance, cultural
order, and political decisions are subordinated to the Islamic Sharia Law (Koopmans,
2015). The Islamic fundamentalism predates the arrival of the Fulani, Othman Dan Fodio
from Futa Jalon into Northwestern Nigeria inhabited by the ethnic Hausa population. Not
all fundamentalists are fanatical and or violent. In its history of wars and conquests, the
Islamic jihad has been portrayed as a holy war on the offending, resistant, or unbelieving
populations whom they called infidels. The Middle Ages crusaders felt similarly against
paganism and heresy (Banner, 2015). The activities of the BH sect bear the violent jihad
identity. Invoking both Prophet Mohammed and patriarch Othman Dan Fodio who
conquered the syncretistic local populations by jihad to establish a pure worship of one
Allah, BH decimates defenseless populations and confronts state military forces. Public
statements of their central objectives claim to have the same devotion and historical goals
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as their predecessors, despite the shifting turns in their development (Adesoji, 2011;
Adenrele, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013b). Dan Fodio’s jihadi campaign out-maneuvered the
preexisting Kanem-Bornu Empire (700-1376) that had converted to Islam in the 11th
century to establish elite Islam ruled by the northwestern Sokoto Caliphate headquarters
(Adam, 2014; Alkali, Monguno, & Mustafa, 2012). A subdued rivalry had been born
between the different Islamic views. The departure in 1096 AD of this elite Caliphate
from their accepted puritanical Islam, which BH sees as a betrayal caused by the
corruption and lures of affluence and compromises to Western education, might represent
a precursor for the faithful (nationalistic) reaction or the violence, terrorism, and
insurgency against all new systems. It has been fueled by other cofactors that include
criminality, politics, economics, radicalization, religious imperialism, and the state action
against BH in 2009 (Alozieuwa, 2012; Osumah, 2014). With the spate of high
unemployment among the young Nigerian (Muslim) population, especially in the
Northeast geo-political region (and generally in the core North), the case for a criminal
BH would conform to a sociological consequence.
The former Federal Education Minister, Gbagi, faulted the 1914 amalgamation by
the British colonial powers of its Northern and Southern protectorates to create Nigeria.
Olaniyan and Asuelime (2014) and Agbiboa (2013c) agreed with Gbagi’s view. The roots
of Nigerian BH insurgency should first be identified and understood. The U.S. experience
in the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia serves as examples that terrorism has
its culture. Such understanding is critical to finding a lasting solution, including isolation
and study of key variables of the philosophy, operations, and aspirations of the group.
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In terms of Nigerian national events, the establishment of the Sharia legal system
in 12 far-northern states may have been the first enabler in the development of BH
antistate activity (Onuoha, 2014a, 2014b). At the time, the Sharia Law adoption was
perceived as a political reaction to frustration precipitated by some politicians
manipulating the religious sentiments following their losses at the polls, using poor
Northern Islamist elements inspired by the vestiges of the religious fundamentalism from
the crisis of Maitatsine (Jegede & Olowookere, 2013). However, BH did not fizzle out as
predicted in 2000 by President Obasanjo. BH insurgency stems from a religious ideology
(David, Asuelime, & Onapajo, 2015).
Nigerian government and the local militia resistance have deployed various
measures to counter BH Islamist ideological insurgency since it morphed into an
acknowledged national crisis between 2002 and 2011. However, BH and their splinter
ally sect Ansaru continue to successfully stage attacks on both the military (hard) and
civilian (soft) targets in Northern Nigeria, particularly on churches, schools, villages,
market places, motor parks, and mosques.
Problem Statement
It is possible to defeat Nigerian BH insurgency in a military face off, but its
ideological roots and impetuses have defied military conquest. Their return after defeats
represents resurgence. The problem is neutralizing resurgence and eliminating root
causes like the violent Islamic radicalization. COIN in Nigeria (i.e., the multinational
military task force, foreign aid and intelligence, extrajudicial killing or decapitation of
insurgent leadership, check points, raids, communication block, closed borders, state of
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emergency declaration, antiterrorism legislation, dialogue, negotiation, and amnesty)
does not address core impetuses like vast youth unemployment, economic poverty, and
disillusionment with corruption of the political, judicial, social, and economic systems in
Nigeria; loss of moral values; intolerant religious extremism; illiteracy; and jihadism
(Cook, 2011; Shaffer, 2016; Vanguard News, 2014).
A looming threat of interreligious war remains. The national executive committee
of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), a body that claims to unite all Christian
(leadership) in Nigeria, in a February 13, 2014 communiqué warned that “The federal
government should come up with an efficient and enduring system that can overwhelm
the resurgence of Boko Haram” (Vanguard News, 2014, p. 1). Its Secretary General, Rev.
Musa Asake, stated that the BH Gunmen and Fulani Herdsmen are slaughtering poor,
noncombatant populations, particularly the Christians, in all troubled localities. In Plateau
state alone within a month, in 2014, over 100 were killed; their houses and churches were
all burnt down (Vanguard News, 2014). The Agatu and Ukpabi Nimbo communities of
Benue and Enugu States were slaughtered by Fulani herdsmen, and the Muslim President
Muhammadu Buhari will not condemn the act.
BH has no representative face. The U.S. COIN model has not vanquished Iraqi
terrorism after surge. The succeeding President Buhari claimed that BH insurgency has
been technically defeated, except the resurgence. Few (2011) criticized the successes the
model has claimed. The COIN war against BH has yet to address the enabling historical,
sociological, economic, or the political issues to effect neutralizing its resurgences. The
religious cause is largely denied; yet Islamic jihad tends to fuel the Sharia law impetus
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(Bolaji, 2013). BH continues to resurface among a sympathizing population since 2002.
Bolaji (2013) discussed historical and political impetuses of Sharia and Islamic jihad,
hypothetically consonant with BH emergence. Figure 1 below shows a BH resurgence
cycle
Impetus

Radicalization

Terrorism
Insurgency

COIN

Figure 1. Resurgency cycle.
There are remote and more recent contributory factors to the violence, terrorism,
ongoing insurgency, and the destruction of human lives and property in Northern Nigeria.
The BH resurged in 2009 (Adesoji, 2011; Cook, 2011; Danjibo, 2009; Onapajo &
Uzodike, 2012; Onuoha, 2012b). Cook (2011) argued that the frustration for the failure of
the Islamic purification movement and the failure of more recent Sharia impositions to
yielded the purist Islamic State. The government did not do much after the 1980 crisis to
eliminate the religious extremism of Muhammed Marwa (Maitatsine) followership.
Marwa is powerfully represented in BH insurgency. Danjibo (2009) posited that
President Yar’Adua had trivialized the July 2009 BH resurgence, choosing rather to
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travel in Brazil. Yar’Adua ordered the release of the sect’s leader Muhammed Yusuf,
who was imprisoned with other Islamic fundamentalists by predecessor President
Obasanjo in 2005.
General Muhammadu Buhari publicly condemned BH’s violent Islamist ideology
after BH had repeatedly massacred defenseless secondary school children (Vanguard
News, 2014). Taiwo (2013), Danjibo (2009), and Isiaka (2015) showed that educational
separatism (Almajiri) has been a contributing factor to the propagation of the insurgency
problem through radicalization. The death of Yusuf would usher in the reign of his
successor, Abubakar Shekau up until the time the sect attained global notoriety, ranking
first in terrorism killings.
Shekau called for more attacks on secondary schools after a series of massacres of
children in Western education schools (The Guardian, 2013). The Catholic Archbishop,
Ekpu, upbraided the sect over war against Western education (Vanguard News, 2013).
Professor Soyinka urged Nigeria to fight BH with Halal (“Boko Halal”), which means
that Western education is good, virtuous, and welcome (Soyinka, 2013). Alozieuwa
(2012) noted that (pure) Muslims do not support the mixing of the secular state and
Islamic Sharia law. They allege that the West brings a corrupting influence on the purity
of Islamic culture (Glover, 2015; Mozayyan, 2009). To neutralize BH resurgence, its root
cause of (extreme) ideological Islamism (jihadism) can no longer be ignored.
Scholars acknowledge there will not be a permanent military solution to an
insurgency (Pham, 2012). BH terrorism and the insurgency continue to resurge against
military counterinsurgency successes because it is primarily driven by grassroots,
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religious, fundamentalist ideology (Islamism), nourished on political, economic,
historical hegemonic impetuses, and criminality. The COIN approach by Nigeria and
intervening states is weak, nonholistic, and not targeted to root out the causes of BH.
Practitioners have singled out a quality education policy, but there is yet no clear
quantitative evidence of what quality education means and how it can address BH. In this
study, I sought to address this problem.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative study was to measure the power (correlation) of
an admixture policy that leverages respect for religion within a holistic educational
curriculum. In this study, I assessed the relationship of the past and present key public
policies to the development of BH insurgency in Nigeria. The nexus of the religious
ideological terrorism informed this study. The covariance of economic poverty impetus
for BH insurgency was weak. Poverty is presumed to be uniformly distributed unless, if
in BH’s case, it is skewed by religious ideology (NBS, 2012). The findings of the study
shall provide evidence-based data that can be used to inform Nigerian policymaking
authorities, scholar-practitioners, security organizations, and the concerned public (local
and global). It will help with closing knowledge gaps on the failings of public policy and
strategic planning, in efforts that would begin to reverse the politically and economically
destabilizing trend of events in Nigeria following the BH insurgency. A THEP may be
used to neutralize the resurgences of the ideological, economic, and political BH.
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Research Questions and Hypotheses
The following relationship-based research six questions in the design addressed
the correlation of the dependent variable (DV), namely, NBHR, to the key independent
variable (IV), THEP over the projected term period.
1. What is the relationship (power) between THEP from nursery to postsecondary
(age 21), at the presumed vulnerable incident population, and neutralizing BH resurgence
against political conspiracies, Islamic hegemony (IH), Sharia policies (SP), and economic
realities (ER) in Nigeria?
[DV1=NBHR1; IV1 = THEP1; CV1=political conspiracies or PC; CV2=IH; CV3
=SP or religious extremism; and CV4=ER]
H11: The effective implementation of THEP designed for the presumed
vulnerable population of Nigeria, from nursery through first degree, over time is related
to neutralizing BH resurgence, over existing key impetuses.
H01: There is no significant relationship of THEP applied in the vulnerable areas
of Nigeria from nursery to secondary and postsecondary level, to neutralizing the BH
resurgence (NBHR).
2. What is the relationship (power) between providing free THEP from nursery to
postsecondary (age 21), at the presumed vulnerable incident population, and neutralizing
BH resurgence against political conspiracies, IH, SP, and ERs in Nigeria?
[DV2=NBHR2; IV2=free THEPf] = DV1-stratified
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H12: The effective implementation of free THEP designed for the presumed
vulnerable population of Nigeria, from nursery to postsecondary, is related to neutralizing
BH resurgence over moderating impetuses.
H02: There is no significant relationship of free THEP applied to the vulnerable
areas of Nigeria, from nursery to postsecondary level, to neutralizing the BH resurgence.
3. What is the relationship of free THEP throughout Nigeria to foot soldier
recruitment pools (FSRP) of BH insurgency within the Nigerian Islamic population?
[DV3 = Dry up FSRP; IV3 =THEP3f]
H13: THEP implemented throughout Nigeria is related to diminishing (drying up)
the recruitment pools of the BH insurgency.
H03: Diminishing the recruitment pools of the BH insurgency is not significantly
related to implementing THEP throughout Nigeria.
4. What is the relationship of BH insurgency recruitment pool to the type, level,
and quality of education attained by its foot soldiers in Nigeria?
[DV3 =Dry up FSRP; CV3a=level of Western education or illiteracy factor]
H14: BH insurgency recruitment may be related to the level of Western education
attained by its foot soldiers.
H04: BH insurgency recruitment is not significantly related to the level of Western
education attained by its foot soldiers.
5. What is the relationship of BH insurgency recruitment pools to the employment
status (economic realities) of its foot soldiers in Nigeria?
[DV3 = FSRP; CV3b = employment status or economic realities]
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H15: Employment status is related to the BH foot soldiers pool.
H05: Employment status is not related to BH foot soldiers pool.
6. What is the relationship of BH insurgency recruitment pool to the Islamic
fundamentalist radicalization of its foot soldiers?
[DV3=FSRP; CV3c=Islamic fundamentalist radicalism-IFR or religious
extremism]
H16: Islamic fundamentalist radicalization is related to the BH foot soldier pool.
H06: Islamic fundamentalist radicalization is not related to the BH foot soldier
pool.
The levels of the relationships of the variables were determined using random
cross-sectional survey samples (the ordinal level) data of the Nigerian native populations
on Likert scales, as detailed in Chapter 3 of this study.
Theoretical Framework of the Study
The theoretical construct of frustration-aggression of the drive theory, written by
Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, and Sears (1939), and modified by Berkowitz (1989),
was relevant to the study. Dollard et al. implied that frustration leads to aggression.
However, in the cognitive model, Berkowitz underscored that not all frustrations lead to
aggression. Richardson, Hammock, Smith, Gardner, and Signo (1994) annunciated four
mediating factors that affect the magnitude of frustration: presence of aggressive cues,
unexpected or arbitrary frustration, cognitive and emotional process, and rumination. Per
catharsis theory, a population that is constantly ruminated by negativism and intolerance
against Western education (or its civilization), supported by indoctrination in Islamist
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ideology, will become radicalized in frustration against it (Bushman, 2002). However,
Alozieuwa (2012) and Adenrele (2012) postulated other theories or the Islamic theocratic
state (Islamic fundamentalism, global jihadi) theory. Alozieuwa discussed other relevant
contributory theories to the BH aggression, such as the deeply divided society theory, the
rational/vengeance theory, the political feud perspective (theory), the conspiracy theory,
corruption theory, and the poverty theory. I approached the problem quantitatively, using
the cross-sectional survey and questionnaires design. I used the drive theory, capable of
providing both the rationale for frustration and vengeance of the Nigerian BH (not
against extrajudicial killings), but for the failed opportunities of their demands of the
Islamist religious ideology.
Nature of the Study
The research design of this study was the structured method of scientific inquiry
or epistemology (to understand, explain, and to predict), especially in the social sciences.
In the quantitative method, the research designs are outlines of procedures through which
data are collected and analyzed for inferential interpretation preceding any generalization
of the results. Creswell (2009) stated that designs are plans and procedures for research,
from assumptions or the units of analysis. The data collected through valid surveys and
experiments for data analysis are a key to quantitative research design. Furthermore,
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) noted that the research design is the blue print
or program that guides the investigator in the various stages (data collection, data
analysis, and interpretation) of the research. In this study, data were collected from a
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randomized sample survey of a cross-sectional research design for members of a properly
informed sample field.
The cross-sectional design was appropriate for this study through the random
sampling of Nigerian population. Cross-tabulation and bivariate percentage analysis of
the outcomes were designed and conducted (Frankfort-Nachmias & Frankfort, 2008). The
quasi-experiment does not require assigning cases to a comparison group, in which a case
is deemed superior to cross-sectional designs (Frankfort-Nachmias & Frankfort, 2008).
This study did not require a comparison group.
Attitudes and behaviors are commonly measured as the response or outcome to
social stimuli or questions (Creswell, 2009; Frankfort-Nachmias & Frankfort, 2008).
Attitudes or behavior changes was the DV. Causality determines the effect. The causes
are IVs. The attitude or behavior was the effect measured in this study, or the resurgence
of BH, which was the main DV (DV1). Neutralizing the resurgence of BH was the
desired effect. High correlation between the causes, key IVs, was inversely proportional
to the degree of the measurable resurgence. The causes were various (the policies or
events that occur), but the key cause, the key IV1 was the THEPf subject to four
controlling variables (CV1, CV2, CV3, CV4) or covariates–the political conspiracy (PC) or
issues with the federal policies to include amalgamation fraud; IH or issues with the bornto-rule mentality of the Islamic North; SP or issues with dualism of religious codes and
the national secular constitution legal system or rule of law; the ER or the issue of
poverty or wealth distribution on political stability, respectively. This was a multiple
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function study, as expected of the root causes or the impetus of the BH phenomenon.
Figure 2 shows the neutralizing resurgence cycle.
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Figure 2. Neutralizing resurgence cycle.
In this cross-sectional random sampling survey, I targeted the central Abuja
Capital mix of the four geographical areas of Nigeria (far-north, east and west; northcentral; southeast and south-south; and the southwest), among the respondent population
who completed the survey questionnaires that were designed to systematically address all
the IVs and CVs, to determine the effect or outcome or the DV. Using the SPSS software,
the correlations of variables were analyzed and interpreted for inferential conclusion,
ensuring both data validity and reliability of results. Both graphical and digital outputs
were examined and evaluated for the degrees of correlations to explain, understand, and
predict the neutralization of BH resurgence.
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Definitions of Terms
Boko Halal: States that “Western education is good” or lawful, permissible.
Soyinka suggested Nigeria to counter BH ideology with “Halal” so I have made up the
term “Boko Halal” for this study.
Boko Haram (BH): BH means “Western education is sin” or unlawful,
impermissible. It is the name given to followers of Mohammed Yusuf because they
denounced Western education (civilization) for “corrupting” the Islamic culture.
Frustration-aggression: Human aggressive behavior is attributable to frustration,
the drive reduction theory earlier articulated by Dollard et al. (1939), and modified by the
Berkowitz (1969) cognitive neo-association model.
Holistic education: Education policy contextually modeled and applicable to
Nigerian geo-politics that integrates elements of the religious, Western, the vocational
and the peace education, with globalism; “students develop to the highest extent thought
possible for a human (Ultimacy) … a mixture of disciplines involving philosophy,
pedagogy, psychology, and theology” (Forbes & Martin, 2004, p. 24-25).
Islamist: A person who seeks or the ideology that proffers governance of state by
the Islamic Shar’ia law; the political Islam (Islamism).
Jihadism: It should mean (positive) religious (spiritual) struggle in Islamic
revival, but it is commonly understood (and practiced) as a violent struggle against nonMuslim (to forcefully convert or be harmed). Jihadi is the individual so engaged, but also
understood as the adjective.
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Middle-Beltan: The Middle Belt region of Nigeria (part of the political North pre
and postindependence) situated in the middle of Nigeria.
Monolithic North: A monolithic north suggests a politically one Northern Nigeria,
especially when considering the Nigerian federal character.
Qur’anic arbitration: Making an Islamic theological case based on the teachings
of Qur’an that the religious ideological grounds of BH is a fallacy, wrong, ignorant,
blasphemous, and misguided; therefore, the sect/insurgents should jettison their cause.
Resurgence: The returning or resurgence tendency of an apparently suppressed
(defeated or controlled) insurgency.
Targeted holistic education policy (THEP): Holistic education applied to areas
vulnerable to radicalization and insurgency.
Terrorism: Terrorism strikes fear into an adversary or opponent (a state, a group,
or individuals), mostly through violence, intimidations, and coercion in the furtherance of
an objective. The FBI (called it “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons and
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (cited in Zeidenstein, 1994, p. 17).
Assumptions
In this study, it was assumed that radicalization of the Islamic population in
Nigeria has only happened among the Muslims in the 19 Northern states, which
constituted the target area for the implementation of THEP, the main IV1 measured. This
did not limit the survey sampling area for data collection, which focused on the four geopolitical areas of north, middle belt, east, and west, nor did it necessitate the stratification
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of data to render the generalization of the results more reliable for the Nigeria public
policy application.
It was assumed that THEP was properly incubated, consistently and efficiently
applied over an optimal time period for the predicted effect to attain maturity, and it was
the best type of education.
I assumed that Western education in Nigeria is correlated to employability and
susceptibility to radicalization, which I sought to establish. I assumed significant
radicalization has happened only in the north and that BH is militarily contained for
THEP to be effectively deployed.
Not all possible causes or impetuses (covariates) for aggression have been taken
into consideration contextually; I assumed that these effects have been captured as a
function of one or more of the various CVs measured by the study.
The sample field was assumed to be informed socially, knowledgeable of the
historical and current geo-political and educational developments, including the subject
of global terrorism and insurgency in both the Nigerian and other global communities. It
was a necessary assumption that will strengthen the validity of survey data and the
measured output of the cross-sectional design.
Scope and Delimitations
COIN has its hard (mostly military) and soft (mostly nonmilitary) components,
and there are various approaches of both. Media (Internet, radio, phone, TV or cybertechnologies, publications) broadcasts and propaganda are soft COIN strategies, but to
maintain internal validity, this study was limited to formal (holistic) educational COIN
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against the ideological basis for aggression of the Islamist BH on target population. The
Nigerian BH insurgent foot-soldiers have been allegedly characterized as mainly the
illiterate or ignorant (of both Qur’anic and or Western education tenets together).
The size of the cross-sectional survey samples (12) was based on G*Power
calculation. The survey instrument was created referencing PsycTESTS Likert-type
Images of Psychiatry Scale (Stuart, Sartorius, & Liinamaa 2014) to address the study
research questions. The choice of the sample population and the focus on the frustrationaggression and Islamic state theoretical and conceptual frameworks strengthens the
external validity. The Nigerian population North or South is not sociologically wellinformed of the evolution and contentions of the BH phenomenon beyond the ordinary
subsistence or marketplace concerns and sentiments. I did not consider the status of the
BH insurgency in the adjoining nations of the region (Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) in the
multinational military taskforce.
Limitations
The limitations of analytical domain, including the covariables that are assumed
of little significance and concepts not measured by design in the survey instrument, shall
not weaken the reliability of quantitative results or interpretation and generalization of
inferences. The recommendations and findings can be used to guide policymakers,
scholars, and scholar-practitioners towards more effective preventative security, COIN,
and de-radicalization policies. In this study, I targeted the educated class (sociologically
informed, not pure clusters) mixed at the capital center Abuja from the various regions or
locations of Nigerian society. This was essential to the validity and reliability of this
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study that captures the overall trend of the social realities. The survey was administered
at approximately the same time (to eliminate maturation issue), and individual responses
were recorded as ordinal data. I captured but did not factor in the nominal data.
Significance
In the Nigerian political and social domain, there are a lot of uncertainties,
complexities, and denials abound concerning the definition and agenda of the BH
insurgency. It is yet to be determined any consensus of the indigenous intellectual (wellinformed) minds how to neutralize the resurgence of BH. This study will contribute to
spurring the policymaking institutions in Nigeria and equipping them with the knowledge
and data to stabilize the population and economic status of Nigeria.
Summary
BH insurgency in Nigeria persists with increasing regional and global
consequences. Another failed state in the sub-Saharan hemisphere, especially of Nigeria
(Newman, 2009; Omitola, 2012), is bad for global business and stability, with increasing
violations of human rights; IDPs’ dislocations, starvation, and deaths; and chaos. Nigeria
has had many failed leadership and policies. The BH insurgency and resurgence (2002–
2016) are attributable to the trouble with Nigerian leadership (Achebe, 1984) and are
failed public policies resulting in one civil war and political and religious upheavals.
Scholars have pointed to the influence of the global Islamist jihadi movement as
the key ideological basis of BH terrorism and insurgency. This understanding of the
background of the Nigerian BH insurgency problem informed the theoretical and
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conceptual framework of this study and was borne out by scholarly literature, explaining
the Islamist challenge of BH.
In Chapter 2, I present the literature review.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
In Chapter 1, I presented information on the BH insurgency in Nigeria. Peerreviewed and seminal articles by scholars, including unfolding news articles and reports
on BH activities, have been studied. Initial literature on BH has been mostly qualitativebased studies, highlighting economic poverty and frustration, systemic corruption in the
political culture, chaos, institutional decay, and high levels of youth unemployment as the
problem (Adesoji, 2010; Agbiboa, 2012a; Alozieuwa, 2012; Ogoloma, 2013; Pham,
2012; Zenn, 2012a). Quantitative evaluations on the causative and the symptomatic
factors to hypothetical long and short-term solutions to the BH resurgence in Nigeria
have yet to be conducted. Some quantitative works have helped to explain the root causes
of the BH insurgency and the persistent threats of resurgence (Asogwa & Asogwa, 2015;
Isiaka, 2015; Njoku & Abubakar, 2017). In this study, I focused on the relationship of
THEP to neutralizing the BH resurgence.
Search Terms and Strategy
I used Google Scholar and the Walden University library search engines to find
sources for the study, along with updates of developments and reports of the unfolding
BH phenomenon. I searched other data sources including the CIA, NCTC, World Bank,
NBS Nigeria, Library of Congress, Amazon.com, vanguardngr.com, and dictionary.com.
I used key words that included holistic education, ultimacy, insurgency,
counterinsurgency, terrorism, counterterrorism, Boko Haram, Islamism, jihad, jihadism,
and resurgence up to 2018.
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Theoretical Foundation and the Literature
BH was frustrated with violations of Sharia Law and the political corruption, and
they blamed it on Western education. They responded with aggression in the form of
terrorism and then insurgency (Richardson et al., 1994; Berkowitz, 1969; Dollard et al.,
1939). Scholars have noted that the BH agenda could be traced to the doctrinal rhetoric of
Sheikh El-Zakzaky’s Muslim Brotherhood since the 1970s (Adesoji, 2010; Agbiboa,
2013d; Cook, 2011; Osumah as cited in Suleiman, 2011; Pham, 2012). BH increased in
strength, seeking to Islamize the Nigerian State by jihad or holy war, expressed in the
insurgency (Adesoji, 2010; Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho, & Onapajo, 2012). It became
an emergent paradigm shift in Nigeria’s enduring insecurity and troubled polity since it
became independent from British Rule in 1960 (Omede & Omede, 2015; Osumah, 2013;
Vanguard News, 2014). However, BH insurgency was not the first attempt to turn the
non-Islamic majority Nigerian State to Islam. There was the Alhaji Ahmadu Bello’s
vision (first Premier of postindependent Northern region) to rule Nigeria by Sharia Law
(Alao, 2009; Vanguard News, 2012). General Ibrahim Babangida registered Nigeria with
the OIC in 1986. The institution of the Islamic Sharia Law and governance in 12 of 19
Northern Nigeria states followed despite public and Christian oppositions (Angerbrandt,
2011; Eme & Ibietan, 2012; Loimeier, 2011; Onuoha, 2010; Ushe, 2015). Despite these
attempts, Northern Nigeria became more Christian, and the Nigerian population became
more secular. By 2002, the control of central political power and defense institutions
gradually migrated out of the North. More Muslim elites in the North became rich from
the oil money (as they controlled over 80% of all oil blocks) scooped from the south-
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south region (Akukwe, 2012; Thompson, 2010). Northern Nigeria elites have been more
secular and corrupt, while the bourgeoning Northern population has been impoverished
and growing in illiteracy (Watts, 2013). They were abandoned to a growing Islamist
radicalism, inspired by local and global Islamic terrorism, and facilitated by new
technologies (Agbiboa, 2013d).
The confluence of illiteracy, poverty, and unemployed and angry youth had
reached an ignition point. This was following the North’s loss of central power, and the
presidential election in 2011 that was won by another southern Christian, Dr. Goodluck
Ebele Jonathan, after he succeeded a Northern Muslim President Alhaji Umaru Musa
Yar’ardua. This angered the Islamic hegemony and frustrated their agenda. The defeat of
the insurgency would lead to the de-radicalization and normalization of the Muslim
Northern Nigeria, to neutralize the resurgence of BH (Kassim, 2015).
Alao (2013) noted that although Northern Nigeria Islam is reformist and
separatist, the Yoruba Muslims in the (more Western-educated) Southwest are not
radicalized. The colonial policies in Nigeria (1914-1960) and in Southwestern Yoruba led
to more Western-educated population compared to the illiteracy in the North, especially
in the northeastern base of BH insurgency (NBS, 2012; Sodipo, 2013). Poverty, although
higher in the North, is a common experience of at least 69% of all Nigerians (Edet,
2015). Ogebe (2012, 2014) disputed a solely poverty/socioeconomic argument. At the
Hearing, Ogebe established the religious radicalization framework as collaboration
between BH and the Fulani herdsmen in a genocidal decimation of the Christian and
churches in Benue State, Nigeria (Spero News, 2013). Economics, social crimes and
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degradations, and unchallenged religious extremism in Nigeria (1914-2014) may point to
a level of culpability for the emergence of BH insurgency.
The Economics Argument
Frustration due to poverty (economic injustice or widespread poverty) is not the
sole cause of the violent aggression and insurgency of the BH Islamic sect (Adenrele,
2012; Sulaiman & Ojo, 2013). Economic poverty and frustration, the systemic corruption
of the political and social order, and the widening chasm between the few super-rich and
the impoverished population is the common experience of most of the Nigerian masses
nationwide (NBS, 2014).
Northern Nigeria (Islamic) politicians and dictators have controlled the nearunitary and central political governance of the Nigerian State and the power for the
distribution of the cash from the national resources since Independence (Eme &
Anyadike, 2012). People in power control the economy and aggrandize their personal and
regional wealth by nepotism (Joseph, 2014). The North currently claims dominance with
19 states out of 36. Many of the wealthiest Nigerians, like the Alhajis Dangote and
Dantata, and most of the former military dictators who became indigenous capitalists by
allotting to themselves oil blocks, hail from the North (Boris, 2015; Fuady, 2015; Ovadia,
2013; Reynolds, 2001). The North has retained a disproportionate political representation
at the portals of federal governance in the legislature (the House and the Senate), and they
constitute majority of the policy-making powers of the near unitary central government.
Nigerians believe most of the wealthiest citizens got rich using state power, which
had resided with Northern leadership for 38 out of 50 years since 1960 (Olaniyan &
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Adetoye, 2013). Although restiveness may correlate with economic poverty, it is a
secondary factor for why and how the BH insurgency has developed and sustained
resurgence in the Northern region of Nigeria. Economics is a factor in an overall holistic
approach to counterterrorism, whereas underdevelopment and poverty correlate with
illiteracy. Systemic corruption of the polity and youth unemployment are factors that are
in all Nigerian sectors in various degrees, that state to state, north to south suffer (NBS,
2010).
Educational Separatism
Soyinka argued that BH insurgents are both religiously and educationally ignorant
(Soyinka, 2012). This was in line with the arguments of Tonwe and Eke (2013), Omede
(2015), Ogoloma and Sampson (2015), Olaniyan (2015), David et al. (2015), Kassim
(2015), Bassiouni (2015), and Higazi (2015). Jegede and Olowookere (2013) argued that
fundamentalists deviate from core doctrines in terms of liberty of expression and
flexibility in meanings of holy books. Soyinka recalled that 30 years earlier in 1982, the
Nigerian minister of education and secretary of the Universities Commission embraced
policies favoring educational separatism that created rooms for Islamic fanatical
indoctrination of youth and subsequent radicalization of its adherents (as cited in Sodipo,
2013). Adamolekun (2013) agreed that the period 1980-2000 saw the development of
Nigerian militant Islamic fundamentalism, post-Iranian revolution, in response to the new
federal constitution where opponents rejected a proposal of Sharia Court of Appeal at the
federal level.
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Agbiboa (2013) showed that 1980-2000, there was an increase in radical Islamic
literatures from Iran in the Northern region of Nigeria. Although the Islamic Almajiri
schools predated Western education in Nigeria (Fowoyo, 2013; Yusha’u, Tsafe,
Babangida, & Lawal, 2013), they flourished in this period aided by federal military rulers
who favored Islam and Sharia (Adamolekun, 2013). The succeeding democratic
governance (the fourth republic) in1999 maintained the status quo (Bolaji, 2013). CAN
had objected to the federal government of Nigeria becoming beholden to Islamic religion
(Agbiboa, 2013a). The Islamic state preferences were in government policies.
Fundamentalist groups like BH against Western education and secular governance were
emboldened. Nigerian Christians embraced Western education, culture, and civilization,
which BH vowed to eradicate and replace with their brand of Islamism (Agbiboa, 2013b;
Oyewole, 2015).
English is the Nigerian official language, but the literacy rate by state (NBS,
2010) showed a wide separation between Southern (mostly Christian) and Northern
(mostly Islamic) states for youth (ages 15 to 24) and for adults (ages 15 and above). The
12 Sharia states were the most illiterate, including the states of Borno, Gombe, and Yobe.
Borno is the birthplace of BH insurgency. These figures have not changed in 2018. The
literacy rates are far below national averages for Sharia states. The Education Data (NBS,
2016) provided details of vast illiteracy in the Islamic North of Nigeria, especially in the
northeast birthplace of BH. The North has few qualified teachers compared to other zones
of the universal basic education (UBE) system, and a prevalence of nonholistic Islamic
(Qur’anic-based Almajiri) educational systems. The North has low attendance at
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(Western-type) primary and secondary schools. The breeding ground abounds for
Islamist radicalization and subsequent contention for an Islamic Sharia state, aided by
politicization of religion amidst resultant economic, poverty, and systemic corruption
(NBS, 2010).
Boko is Hausa a customized word for book, and Haram is Arabic for sin or taboo.
BH spokespersons, Kabiru Sokoto and Abu Qaqa, argued that the Western civilization
and culture (taught by the Western education) are haram, sin, or forbidden (Onuoha,
2012b). Their official name “Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad” is in Arabic,
and it means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and
Jihad" (Chotia, 2012; Erdag, 2016; Walker, 2012). Acts of terrorism (e.g., Nyanya Motor
Park bombing) and sadism (slitting victims’ throats on camera) and their opposition to
Western education defined the activities of BH’s Jihad expedition in Nigeria. The
Muslims in Nigeria had lived at peace with others (Christians and traditionalists) despite
past religiously motivated turmoil (Last, 2007). Islam’s Prophet Mohammed witnessed
Muslims, Jews, and Christians living together in peace (Onuoha, 2014). BH abhors
Nigerian pro-Western secular education and the state. The Education Data of Nigeria
(NBS, 2016) showed that the states with high BH insurgency and resurgence have lower
literacy rates in every measure. Nigerian-targeted (hard) COIN efforts have not been
sufficient. Not neutralizing BH resurgence threatens a failed state like Somalia (Bassey,
2014; Ekineh, 1997; Marcus, 2015; Punch News, 2014; Simon, 2014). In this study,
THEP was tested as a framework to neutralizing BH resurgence. Western education is
embraced and integrated in the Yoruba Western Nigeria that has no Sharia law states;

38
they are about 25% or more Muslim, not known to be radicalized or connected with the
BH insurgency.
Theoretical Foundation: Roots and Origin of Boko Haram
The frustration and aggression (Berkowitz, 1969) of BH were captured in various
articles. In 2014 many questions were being asked about how and why a once unknown
Muslim cleric Mallam Abubakar Lawan’s community of Muslims in 1995 became an
Islamic religious revivalism organization around the University of Maiduguri, run by
college dropout students in Northeastern Kanuri region of Nigeria. Ustaz Mohammed
Yusuf the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad metamorphosed into an organized
sect (Forest, 2012) and a well-funded terrorist Islamist insurgency (Agbiboa, 2013c;
Chotia, 2012; Cook, 2011; Onuoha, 2012b). Yusuf identified as a Wahabbist scholar, and
he built a mosque that equally served as school for poor families (Connell, 2012). BH is
more than an insurgency (Cook, 2014). Nigeria and Cameroun, Chad, and Niger
republics are fighting a civil war, and Benin Republic to the west has joined the COIN
war on BH (Oyewole, 2015).
BH had grown in numbers and in sophistry and spread of their activities. BH
established an Islamic Caliphate (Washington Times, 2014) in parts of Northeastern
Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in the Gwoza region (Allison, 2014;
Azumah, 2014; Cook, 2014). BH has overrun army bases and counterterrorism military
forces. Their fighting force was estimated from 10,000 to 50,000 (Cook, 2014). BH
absorbed heavy casualties from the MNJTF. In this study, a military shield against BH
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resurgence has been assumed (Pham, 2016), to go along the effective implementation of
THEP.
BH blamed political corruption and failures of Islam on the ethos of Western
education, civilization, and culture, and they held the Muslim oligarchs responsible. They
demanded the full-scale Sharia in the polity, motivated by the Al Qaeda, Al-Shabaab,
Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and ISIS (Arsenault & Bacon, 2015; Thomson, 2012;
Cook, 2012; Forest, 2012; Onuoha, 2012b; Zenn, 2012a). Although Maiangwa (2014)
argued the implication of the socioeconomic impetus for the resurgence of BH, scholars
also pointed to the religious movement post-Iranian revolution era in late 1970s, Islamic
revivalism, radicalization, and religious militancy born of Islamic hegemony and
politicization of religion (Adesoji, 2010; Maiangwa, 2014). For BH, the Islamism
transcended ethnic hegemony (Sunday & Francis, 2014). They rejected Western ideas.
BH’s rejection of Western education became the precondition to create the terrorist
reactions and insurgency (Forest, 2012).
Beside the economic, the military counterterrorism, and COIN responses,
education has been recommended as central to a lasting coexistence model and the
neutralization of BH resurgence. However, the literacy framework has yet to be
researched, tested, proven, or established by scholars and practitioners for its power in the
Nigerian complex context. Fowoyo (2013) pointed out that President Goodluck
Jonathan’s modern Almajiri school system was conceived to correct the negative impact
of Islamic religious indoctrination and manipulation of the Almajiris by radicalized
Islamists and to turn out future global leaders and productive professionals in a diverse
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society and modern global economy. The goal was a complete reformation of the
Qur’anic school (Abubakar & Njoku, 2015; Dahiru, 2011). However, despite THEP, BH
radicalism has not abated; it operates in the ideology of apocalyptic Islamism (Celso,
2015; Flannery, 2015).
Similarity and Collaboration in Terror and Jihad–Holy War
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, operatives of
Islamist terrorism organizations have proliferated (Analy, 2016). They are in sub-Saharan
Africa regions, in the Mali-Nigerian-Congo laterals and Somali-Kenya axis (DalgaardNielsen; 2010; Fair, 2008; Gunaratna & Nielsen, 2008; Hoffman, 2009; Joscelyn, 2013).
Like Pakistanization of the Al Qaeda, BH has become the Nigerianization of Al Qaeda or
Al Qaeda in Nigeria or AQIN (Chotia, 2012; Fair, 2008; Onuoha, 2012b). BH is a
member of Al Qaeda in West Africa (AQWA). BH has pledged alliance to ISIS (Duta,
2016; Karmon, 2015; Nwankpa, 2015; Voll, 2015). By their manifesto, BH is the Islamic
State in Nigeria or ISIN (Weeraratne, 2015).
Predictions of Disintegration and the BH Problem
The merger of ethnic nationalities in Nigeria was without the consent of the
African natives (Ibiloye, 2016). BH insurgency put Nigeria on course for destabilization
(Zenn, 2013a). BH is the JASDJ Group of the Sunni People for the Calling and Jihad or
the Nigerian Taliban (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; NCTC, 2014; Onuoha, 2012b; Pham,
2012; Solomon, 2012). The Islamic Jihad is Islam’s holy war, although jihad literally
means struggling or striving (Kabbani & Hendricks, 2017) or Islam’s struggle for truth
(Cook, 2015; Wiktorowicz, 2001). The ideological framework of BH insurgency assumes
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the violent Islamic jihad against others who differ, and it reflects perceptions of Islam (in
the West) due to the scourge of terrorism associated with Islamists. The ideological basis
of the insurgency was targeted in this study as a root cause to neutralize the resurgence.
Education and reeducation are an antidote to ignorance (Erdag, 2016; Kumo & Abubakar,
2015; Soyinka, 2012). In this study, I tested for correlations and the power of THEP to
neutralize BH resurgence, using the cross-sectional survey design.
Four Cardinal Public Policies
About three or four public policies of Nigeria are associative for the past 100
years. General Yakubu Gowon’s reneging on the Aburi (Confederation) Accord in 1967
led to the Biafra secession, the civil war, and the annulment of the tripod political balance
as the outcome of the war. General Ibrahim Babangida also decided to register Nigeria in
1986 as an Islamic country with the OIC. The Sharia Law states (1999-2000) and the
Islamic hegemony of the Caliphate North attempted to Islamize Nigeria. The status quo
was threatened by the election of another southern Christian, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, to
the presidency in 2009, following 8 years of the President Obasanjo regime. It was too
long of a period of loss of political power for the Northern Muslim oligarchy. These
landmarks defined epochs in Nigerian political history creating the pathway to the
escalation of BH terrorism and insurgency (Forest, 2012; Osumah, 2013). With global
Islamism and conspiracies, they informed the framework and hypotheses of this study for
THEP to neutralize BH resurgence.
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On the Allegations of Conspiracies
Conspiracy theory can follow political crises, like in the aftermath of the 1980
Maitatsine Islamic jihad (Isichei, 1987). The alleged educational and economic dearth of
the North was related to the conspiracy of amalgamation policies by Lord Lugard from
1914. Some believed that it was a political sell out of the South prior to postindependence
Nigeria in 1960-66 and beyond (Agbiboa, 2013a; Dudley, 2013). A confederacy, as
determined by the Aburi Accord in 1967 to resolve the threat of secession by the Eastern
region might have challenged the North to become more competitive, realizing the
benefits of Western education even within a predominantly Islamic society in an
emerging global economy. Religious sects like BH might have been mere local grudges.
The British created similar European religious controversy in Africa. The Alhaji Ahmadu
Bello intention, and General Babangida’s action (Alao, 2009; Vanguard News, 2012),
were conspiracies that motivated BH’s agenda and insurgency campaign for a total
Islamic Caliphate in the North (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Campbell, Bunche, &
Harwood. 2012; Forest, 2012; Gilbert, 2014; Onuoha, 2012b; Zenn, 2012a).
The military dictatorships in Nigeria left political power brokerage with the North
and induced a born-to-rule mentality in the hegemony of the jihadist Islamic Sokoto
Caliphate. It has filtered into Northern Islam, Islamism, and the sectarian politics of
radicalized groups like Maitatsine (1980), BH, the Ansaru, and their sponsors. They used
negative global and local social, cultural, and economic and political developments to
justify terrorism and insurgency on Nigeria polity to buttress their rejection of secular
governance. The ascension of President Jonathan, who hailed from a minority Southern
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Ijaw tribe and was not Muslim, irritated the Northern oligarchy (Aghedo & Osumah,
2012; Campbell, 2012; Forest, 2012; Gilbert, 2014; Onuoha, 2012; Onapajo & Uzodike,
2012a; Zenn, 2012a). The roots of BH went beyond the 1995 or 2002 formations and the
2009 and 2011 explosions of the insurgency. In this study, this political conspiracy was a
covariate. Onapajo and Uzodike (2012a) claimed that BH contended that the arts of
Western civilization (haram) harmed the pure Islamic culture.
The BH insurgency may be the culmination of the effects of landmark policies
and political epochs in the Nigerian history (Forest, 2012; Kukah, 2009; Onuoha, 2012a).
The insurgency will reoccur if it is not neutralized (Adesoji, 2010; Aro, 2013; Comolli,
2015; Iyekekpolo, 2016; Osumah, 2013) and threaten a weakened Nigeria (Solomon,
2015). However, neutralizing BH resurgence through THEP is suggested because the
Southwest Yoruba tribe in Nigeria is both highly educated (Western education) and a
25% Muslim population, but is not radicalized. There is a correlation between Western
education and Islamist radicalism and possibly deradicalization. The Peace Project
experiment in Kano State, Northern Nigeria, did not change Islamic radicalism in Kano
with the beheading of Agbahime in 2016, but provided precursory experiments of
components of holistic education. The Opon Imo (tablet of knowledge) education policy
(hoped to help modernize education and instill religious tolerance) in Muslim populated
Southwestern Osun State of Nigeria was useful in preventing the conspiratorial born-torule hegemony argument in the framework of this study.
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The New Secession and Failed State Threats
The Wazirin Bauchi, Alhaji Muhammadu Bello Kirfi leader of the Northeast
Forum for Unity and Development, hinted that the North may need to secede from
Nigeria (Gundu, 2012). There were threats in 1953 and 1966 of the North seceding from
Nigeria (Campbell, 2010). With the escalation of tribal, ethnic, religious, political,
economic crisis, and violence in Nigeria, the North may provide an impetus towards state
failure. In response to the increasing BH attacks, Lamido of Adamawa repeated Alhaji
Kirfi’s threat, saying he will lead his Adamawa kingdom to the other side in Cameroun
republic. Although the insurgency was increasing in 2012 and centered in the
Northeastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, President Jonathan declared a state of
emergency rule in Borno state on May 14, 2013 (Vanguard News, 2013). Abubakar noted
that insecurity and violence were all over the land and assured journalists that BH will
pass away (Vanguard News, 2012). BH insurgency may succeed in separating an Islamic
Sharia State (Caliphate) in their Northeast base, or in the 12 Northern Nigeria states
already under the Sharia Law rules, but the Shiite and Sunni Islamic sects in Nigeria do
not live peaceably together (Alao, 2013; Osakwe, 2014). The Sunni is the majority sect.
The secular unity of Nigeria has become threatened (Agbiboa, 2013c; Njoku &
Hamid, 2014). Pham (2012) argued that the resurgence of the BH sect in 2010 came after
it was presumed fractured and defeated when over 700 members were killed and at the
killing of its founder Mohammed Yusuf. However, the BH grew in strength and lethality
and established links with global terror groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS in the Islamic
Maghreb (Forest, 2012). The sect is an emerging threat to the United States (Cooke,
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2011). The sect cannot be defeated (neutralized) through an arms struggle (Forest, 2013).
Nigerians cannot share common national identity, and the BH ideology may last
(Agbiboa, 2013c). The secession threat by Biafra failed in 1970, but at Aburi in 1967, the
Generals Gowon and Ojukwu agreed that the country would be split into confederated
regions. The reneging on that truce by Nigeria tore the nation apart. The agitation for
Biafra has resurged 45 years after the war, in response to perceived continuity of
oppression by Nigerian public policy. The end of conflict in 1970 created separate peace
in regions and subregions of Nigeria similar to the post-Surge Iraq (Hagan, Kaiser, &
Hanson, 2015).
Scope and Support of BH
The scope of BH crisis in 2014 extended beyond regional Cameroon, Niger,
Chad, and Benin republics to international crisis with kidnappings. The Washington Post
of May 20, 2014, called BH an international problem. BH had developed to a threat to the
international security. A coalition of America, France, United Kingdom, China, Israel,
has rallied to support Nigeria (Ikeji, 2014). A summit of regional heads of states from the
republics of Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Benin, and Cameroun, was called by their French
counterpart, President Francois Hollande, and attended by representatives of US and UK,
with aim to combat the funding, training, and arms supply of BH insurgency, and to help
with intelligence (Punch News, 2014; USA Today, 2014). The kidnaps, herdsmen, BH
protégé genocides, IDP problem, and deaths from malnutrition and disease are of regional
and international concern. BH was forced out of Sambisa forest stronghold but it resurged
into other new areas in the region (Aljazeera, 2016; Aning & Amedzrator, 2016).
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Kidnapping and Hostages
Abductions, kidnaps and hostage-taking of persons have continued before and
after the game-changing global outrage for the alleged abduction and forced conversions
to Islam of about 276 teenage girls, almost all Christians, from their dormitory at the
Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, in Borno state Nigeria (April 14, 2014), by
BH insurgents. A published list of the missing girls had 180 out of which 165 were
identified as Christians (Punch News, 2014). In this study, key historical and definitional
framework has helped in determining the hypotheses. Terrorism in the world has a long
history. The United States of America and the West in general has been the target of
groups’ and global terror (Crenshaw, 2001; Sharma, 2013). The American people and
facilities home and abroad have born about a third of all international terrorist attacks in
the past thirty years, Crenshaw (2001). This view which assumes that terrorism is
exported from certain global locality bears a bias that is in dispute (David et al., 2015).
Rapoport (2001) stated that in the long and bloody history of terrorism, the attacks
on the United States of America on September 11, 2001, represented the most significant
landmark and game-changer. For Nigerian BH insurgency, it is the Chibok Girls kidnap
saga. The perpetrators (al-Qaeda or BH) may disagree with this view, because they may
have a different definition of terrorism which sees the United States or Nigerian secular
governance as the aggressor of first cause and therefore the perpetrator of terror, whereas
their groups and people are the victims and or freedom fighters, so the difference is
relative (Coggins, 2014; McCauley, 1991, 1993).
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Boko Haram Casualty Tolls
Similar arguments are proffered by the Islamist sect BH, who is at war against
Western education influences and or assault on their Islamic culture and heritage in
Nigeria (Maiangwa, 2013). In the twentieth century, Rummel (1996) estimated about 170
million people had died in the attacks by states against the people (state terrorism). This,
excluding about 34 million killed in battles (wars); and most killers were German Hitler,
Chinese Mao, and Russian Stalin, about 20, 37, and 42 million each, Rummel counted;
and in the same period of time, non-state terrorists like Islamists, guerillas and others
accounted for about 500,000 killings, he continued. McCauley (2007) concluded based
on these figures that state terrorism must be more dangerous (Castro & Martinez, 2016;
Feenberg, 2016). BH terrorist attacks have been resurgent since becoming a full scale
insurgency in 2011, and over 10 thousand killed (Vanguard News, 2014). By 2016 it had
exceeded 20,000 plus destruction of properties, Godefroidt, Langer, and Meuleman
(2016). The FBI defined terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against
persons and property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. This definition shall
include both state and non-state actors, David et al. (2015) contended, realizing that there
are over 100 diplomatic and academic definitions of terrorism, Krueger and Maleckova
(2002) noted.
In 2014, daily media, news reports and articles inundated Nigeria and the global
readership with the acts of BH terrorism and the insurgency war. Suspected BH suicide
bomber attacked the Nyanya public transport terminal in the federal capital territory,
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Abuja and killed about 74 people, and injuring many more. Chief Olisa Metuh, who was
the Publicity Secretary of the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) described it as
barbaric, monstrous, and extremely wicked. He accused opposition party All Progressives
Congress (APC) of conspiracy to make the country ungovernable by inciting and
sponsoring terrorism (Vanguard News, 2014). Punch News columnist Bayo Olupohunda
(Punch News, 2014) disputed the accusation, but Vanguard News in a statement credited
to General Muhammadu Buhari in 2012 corroborated it. The APC was the brainchild of
opposition leader General Buhari who won the 12 Islamic Sharia states in the North
including the northeastern states where Boko Haram is based, in the 2011 presidential
election. After he lost to President Goodluck Jonathan, Buhari went to court and lost, but
had reacted publicly promising to make the country ungovernable if he lost again in the
2015 presidential elections. Buhari said that by the grace of God the dog and the baboon
will all be soaked in blood if he lost (Ajayi, 2012).
The BH attacks climaxed with the Chibok girls kidnapping on the night of
Nyanya blasts on April 14, 2014. BH burned down their school buildings. Alhaji
Abubakar Shekau, the alleged BH leader in a recorded video message showed the girls in
hijabs reciting the Qur’an. He stated they will be sold into slavery and forced into
marriage, He offered exchange for their imprisoned fighters (Nigeriaworld, 2014). Two
years later and going the Chibok girls are assumed lost and irretrievable (Obasanjo,
2016). The COIN war assumed new dimension with the hash tag tweeter message
#BringBackOurGirls global outrage that fueled international rally against BH insurgency.
The US, UK, France and others pledged provision of intelligence and practical assistance
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to Nigeria to rescue the girls and to defeat the Islamist sect BH (Ikeji, 2014; Vanguard,
2014). BH has continued to resurge despite defeats (Godefroidt et al., 2016; Vanguard
News, 2017).
Brands of Boko Haram
Senator Khalifa Zanna, representing Borno Central noted there are three brands of
BH; Sharia BH, criminal BH, and the political BH (The Sun, 2013). Its evolution in 2002
suggested some international influence, in tandem with rise in global terror awareness,
after the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda’s terror attack on US (Aghedo, Osumah, 2012).
BH phenomenon rose from an obscure Islamic fundamentalist revivalism campus group
at the University of Maiduguri, started 1995/97 by Abubakah Lawan as ‘Ahlulsunna
wal’jama’ah hijra’, through the time of its first violent disposition in 2002/2003 under the
leadership of Mohammed Yusuf (d. 2009). The sect attacked police stations at Geidam
and Kanamma hometown of Alhaji Yusuf, Yobe state in 2002 but attained a lethal status
under Alhaji Abubakar Shekau. This is the sharia and political BH. The Fulani herdsmen
have joined the criminal BH, as identified by president Buhari’s Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) General Tukur Buratai (Vanguard, 2016). BH identified with the ISIS in 2014,
but has split when ISIS appointed new BH leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi over its West
Africa operations. He was rejected by Shekau (AFP World, 2016).
A Military Shield
In the middle of the decade of the US counterterrorism war in Iraq, 2003 to 2013,
there was a military surge in 2007 which militarily overwhelmed the Sunni resistance and
was touted and referenced as successful stratagem against the insurgency. It provided
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some breathing room for the deployment of other neutralizing policies to discourage
resurgency (Biddle, Friedman, & Shapiro, 2012; Feaver, 2011). The Shia-majority Iraqi
government of President Al Maliki did not follow that script, and there has been a
resurgence of new insurgency fighting for an Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
or Syria (ISIS). BH has become a protégé of ISIS ideology. Hagan, Kaiser & Hanson
(2015) argued that Iraqi surge created a separate peace for the two dominant communities
or sects, the Sunni and the Shia Muslims. One reason for the surge was to create room at
the end to reintegrate, rehabilitate, and reconcile the sectarian divides. However, the
reconciliation did not happen according to the Bush agenda (Gabrielsen, 2013; Hagan et
al., 2015; Juhasz, 2014). A military shield from BH is necessary to deploy THEP.
There is no known effective postwar THEP model operative in the Iraq region
aimed at neutralizing the resurgence. Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh have
deployed quasi-educational programs of this nature in containing insurgency. Nigeria
employed some amnesty program to suspend the Niger-Delta insurgency for the ills
visited on them by oil exploitation. The militants are still around and threatening to come
back (The Guardian News, 2015). By April 2016, the Niger Delta Avengers had resumed
insurgency in the region. The BH insurgency has similar impetuses, and an ideological
goal for an Islamist religious outcome, within a multiethnic and multireligiously complex
Nigeria State, where Christianity is about half the population or more and making inroads
in the Islamic North (Omotosho, 2015; Pew Survey, 2011). Christianity predominates in
the South, and it is the first target of Islamist fundamentalism and terrorism in Northern
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Nigeria (The Independent, 1995). The impetus of BH Islamism is the religious ideology
that enthrones the Sharia Law Islamic State (Kassim, 2015).
The alleged corruption of the Nigerian sociopolitical and economic systems
heated the polity. Islamist radicalization motivated apocalyptic resistance by BH, now
difficult to extinguish (Kierkegaard, 2016; Swarts, 2014). State terrorism violated
Muslims’ basic human rights, by stripping, impoverishing, and ignoring the population,
culpable under Westernized colonial and postcolonial governance alien to Islam. The
socioeconomic root cause of BH (David et al., 2015) is commonplace across Nigeria, but
the religious impetus is not, the radicalization and the violence. A military shield may
allow THEP intervention that may neutralize ideological resurgence. If the education
profile in the Northern region (David, et al, 2015) is the root cause, and education gap the
difference between the Southwestern and the Northern Nigeria Muslim, then the effect of
THEP needed to be studied.
Literature Related to Key Variables
Ekwueme and Obayi (2012) focused on the role of the media in winning the war
against BH insurgency. The media could help to fight the ideological bases to neutralize
BH resurgence. Zenn (2012b, 2013b) suggested that AQIM has infiltrated the BH group
and that its strategic spread from the Northeast to the Islamic rulers in Northwestern
Nigeria has caused dissent among its membership. Northern Nigeria constituted the
targeted region for this study. LeVan (2012) argued against BH designation as a FTO, for
economic reasons, and because it will potentially limit U.S. policy options to those least
likely to work. Although David et al. (2015) argued that socioeconomic and political
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indices were concealed in religion, I considered these moderating covariates, but assumed
it is the ideological basis of intolerant Islamism that drives the enduring BH frustrationaggression of resurgence, unlike the responses of non-Islamists to the same conditions.
Walker (2012) portrayed BH as an Islamic sect, not in the same global jihadist
bracket or status as Algeria’s al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or the Somali’s alShabaab in the Sahel. Walker (2012) suggested that BH will continue to attack soft
targets, but questioned government approach as a possible solution. An ideological
insurgency could not be neutralized militarily. Campbell and Bunche (2011) argued that
diplomacy and democracy, and not hostile fire-power, is the best way to undermine the
growing Islamism threat in Nigeria. Campbell et al. (2012) claimed BH includes Islamic
revivalist dimension and was connected to the Al-Qaeda insurgency in Northern Mali,
but just one aspect of the violence plaguing Nigeria. BH now attacks Muslims associated
with the secular agenda of central government, Christians, churches, and mosques, alike.
There is a growing threat by an emerging Islamist sect BH, once unknown but
later established in their violent insurgency activities in the Northern region of Nigeria.
They have spread into neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, and they are in contact
with northern Mali Islamist Al Qaeda sect and ISIS. Their spread as Fulani herdsmen
ravaging communities in central and southern Nigeria is unclear (Vanguard, 2016). BH
organizational structure and leadership are under study because they have operated
underground and conducted violent activities of kidnaps, suicide bombing, and killings of
foreign nationals in Nigeria. BH attacks the military. International attention and
involvement are helping to stop the group.
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Pham (2012) recognized that extremism and violence could not be contained by
arbitrariness and mere analytical constructs because BH has grassroots support among the
marginalized native population. If the root cause is not neutralized, then the problem will
continue to fester, which means resurgence, Gilpin and Giroux (2014) agreed. Johnson
(2011) acknowledged that BH draws its following from impoverished Islamic students,
clerics, university students, and unemployed professionals, and the sponsors may be the
Nigerian elite. Johnson claimed BH insurgency is a result of failed public policies and the
unequal establishment of Islamic Sharia that did not punish corrupt public officials who
stole millions free but jailed the poor people for minor theft. However, BH reaction might
be disproportionate. Manni (2012) recommended elimination of corruption, but did not
identify who was corrupt, by how much, and the destination of the stolen wealth by the
Nigerian political class.
A chart of poverty by various regions of Nigeria reveals the state of the North
(Adenrele, 2012). Factors beside the moral, economic, and political corruption root
causes have been identified as relevant IVs in the study of counterterrorism and COIN
(Alozieuwa, 2012; Isichei, 1987; Saad, 1988). Maiangwa (2014) emphasized the religious
ideology factor. Onuoha (2012a) argued that the battle against insurgency must include
the government addressing Northern Nigeria’s poverty, unemployment, and perceived
social injustice. Over 80% of the estimated 9.5 million Nigerian Islamic Almajiris live in
the terrorism-prone Northern region, which makes a case for a targeted COIN program.
Fowoyo (2013) pointed out that education at the secondary and tertiary levels is not free
for the modern Almajiri school agenda, which is not holistic by design. Sampson (2012)

54
recommended that a counterterrorism strategy should include some political reform that
addresses imbalance in social and economic realities affecting populations in the North.
However, all regions in Nigeria face similar political and economic realities but do not
incubate terrorism alike, and they are not equally prone to the Islamic terrorism as the
predominantly Muslim North experiences.
However, Cobb, McClintock, and Miller (2016) addressed the necessity of a
spiritually-based educational curriculum in fighting Islamic terrorism. Forbes (1996,
2004, 2012) outlined the claims of holistic education and holistic schools and of
spirituality and the whole child approach. There are many values relevant to addressing
the literacy gap for the Islamic population of Northern Nigeria. Although new schools
and projects have recognized the necessity to pursue some types of holistic education
programs, the Nigerian educational curricula in the North does not provide for THEP
designed to address the national education crisis. Nigeria did not anticipate the BH
insurgency crisis from its complex and variant constituent regions and ethnic
nationalities, with respect to impacts of religious identities (Abubakar & Njoku, 2017;
Fowoyo, 2013; Isiaka, 2015).
Ethno-religious values and cultural identities engendered mutual distrust among
the Nigerian ethnic nationalities. They were held together by political forces, either the
colonial or the military despotism, during and after colonialism (Agbiboa, 2013c; Sodipo,
2013). The British colonial masters were aware of the disparities including those of
education (Maiangwa, 2014). In expounding the realist theory, Maiangwa (2014) accused
the colonialists of Machiavellian and Hobbesian inspiration and named a triad of
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conspiracy by the colonial rulers of Nigeria, the military dictators, and the political
intrigues that held the disparate units together by force and continued to do so for their
own selfish interests.
A Gap in Literature
Most recommendations for resolving the insurgency would cite improving the
education of Northern Nigeria, but there was no quantitative study how THEP may
neutralize the ideological root causes of BH (David et al., 2015). Scholar commentaries
on educational policies in Nigeria and the effect on BH embody nondeterminative
references to the importance of quality education in the COIN war. Targeted holistic
education and its power to neutralize the scourge of continued resurgence of BH and the
ideologically driven social violence have yet to be examined (Abubakar & Njoku, 2017;
Isiaka, 2015; Peter & Isaac, 2013; Vanguard News, 2014). However, in this study, the
random survey of samples of educated Nigerians (North, Middle, South West, and South
East), were assessed to evaluate the degree of relationship of the DVs and IVs. The
educational and social needs of the Islamic Northern Nigeria compared to their Southern
counterpart in the federation have been studied by several scholars (Agbiboa, 2012b;
Alkali et al., 2012; Alozieuwa, 2012; Campbell et al., 2012; Cook, 2014; Effoduh, 2014;
Ekwueme & Obayi, 2012; Forest, 2012; Jocselyn, 2013; Johnson, 2011; Ogunrotifa,
2013; Onuoha, 2012a, 2012b; Pham, 2012; Walker, 2012; Zenn, 2012a). Pham (2012)
pointed out the grassroots support by the poor and marginalized and that defeating the
group will be difficult, making the case for the prospects of BH resurgence. Johnson
(2012) supported Pham’s view and added that BH draws support from the unemployed
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and dropouts. Zenn (2012a, 2013a) claimed that BH works with Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), whereas Campbell and Bunche (2012) highlighted BH’s hostility to
Christianity and to those Muslims who support the corrupt secular governments at the
local, state, and national levels. Diplomacy and democracy are better ways than violent
force to undermine the BH ideology, but there were no studies that have tested those
postulates. Alozieuwa (2012) discussed the terrorism and counterterrorism theories on the
security challenge of the Nigerian BH, but not the concept of THEP. This was the gap
that informed the hypotheses for this study: the power of THEP to neutralize BH
resurgence, when effectively tested on the identified restive population in Nigeria over
time.
The results of this study will help to neutralize resurgence of the ideological BH.
This was a reversibility-ultimacy model to neutralize BH resurgence. The vulnerable and
radicalized Islamic Northern region of Nigeria and areas of the geographical South that
are viewed vulnerable were the targets. This study was not about the relationship of
continued BH insurgency and the failure or disintegration of Nigeria.
Summary and Conclusion
BH is the emergence of a new Islamic state in Nigeria. Waldek and Jayasekara
(2011) argued that BH represented the evolution of Islamist extremism in Nigeria.
Nigerian government vacillated on how to deal with the insurgency amidst internal
resistance. Subsequent scholarship had established the BH identity, but research on
containment, counterinsurgency, and neutralization has continued. In the case of BH, the
MNJTF of Nigerian, Cameroun, Chad, and Niger has regained most of territories of their
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August 2014 Caliphate that had its headquarters in Gwoza. The insurgency has continued
to deploy male and female suicide bombers, lay ambushes on the military, and reorganize
and launch attacks in the region.
BH was not defined as a jihadi insurgency or a foreign terrorist organization by
the United States until 2013 while sect sustained terror attacks and insurgency war on
Nigeria State, vowing to Islamize it. BH’s tactics, targets, weaponry, and attack locations
continued to evolve, but the ideology has remained constant. CAN in January 2017 sent
out an alarm on Southern Kaduna massacres of Christians by the Fulani herdsmen, and
claimed that BH was establishing a new stronghold in the Kagoro Forest Foothills
following their losses in Sambisa Forest. However, the media emphasis on their main
objective, by 2014, had dangled from the Islamization of the Nigeria State, to the
establishment of a separate, independent Islamic State in Northern Nigeria. This shifting
represented a difference in terms of understanding the sect’s goals and the local, national,
and international response most appropriate to neutralize their operations. It was
important for scholars to clarify the identity and objectives in the course of finding
possible resolutions.
Twelve predominantly Muslim states of the political 19 Northern states of Nigeria
had adopted the Islamic Sharia law to govern their states between 1999 and 2002. The
insurgency increased in strength and spread between 2014 and 2015, and attracted the
support of other terrorist organizations, including AQIM and AQAP, Somali al-Shabaab,
the defunct Libyan forces, and other Islamic jihadists roaming in the Sahelian region.
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Until 2009, the literature on BH was scarce, and its status as a terrorist group was
being debated. This ambiguity on the identity of the BH terror group was reflected in
literature. Recommendations to address the insurgency were made but did not include
THEP. The ambiguity of BH identity and purpose persisted until 2013 when the United
States named BH an FTO on November 13, 2013.
The power of THEP to neutralize BH resurgency has not been adequately
represented in quantitative studies, as COIN policy for Nigeria. Data-based resources
were scarce. The Peace Club Project (Sodipo, 2013) based in Kano, North-central Nigeria
and the Opon Imo educational policy in the Southwestern Osun State (Sanusi, Omowale,
& Kayode, 2014) were quasi-holistic programs respectively, in the genre of THEP in
Nigeria. BH’s operational epicenter includes Northeastern Nigerian states of Borno,
Yobe, and Adamawa, which are at the bottom on the literacy scales.
In this study, I sought to establish how the gaps support the conceptual framework
of behavior modification by THEP and associated hypotheses of the research questions
that the study was designed to test. I considered COIN efforts of the government and
others, if they have been successful in dealing with the crisis, providing a military shield
enough to create the stability in the polity to permit the introduction and administration of
THEP in the Nigerian system.
In Chapter 3, I present the methods of the study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
This was a nonexperimental, postpositivist study that measured the relationship
between THEP over a projected time period and prospects of it neutralizing resurgence of
the BH. Key policies that augmented violent Islamism in Nigeria were generally viewed
as variable factors propelling insurgency. The education policy was the key IV. This was
a reductionist, deterministic study.
By randomly surveying a cross-section of socially informed respondents in
Nigeria who were aware of the BH crisis and were knowledgeable of the effects on
Nigerian sociological dynamics, data were anonymously collected on simulated survey
instruments (questionnaires) developed and valid for this study. Data analysis included
use of SPSS for ANOVA, MANCOVA, and or ANCOVA, for the descriptive statistics
and the multiple regression analyses of the correlations of variables (the dependent and
independent). Assuming a standard normal distribution, a confidence interval of 95%
(c=0.95), two-tailed test (α=0.05), Zc = 1.96 right tail separation, and moderate degrees of
freedom (n – 1), n was the sample size, calculated using the G*Power analysis program.
The hypotheses were tested (t-tests) analyzing the data with the SPSS software and the
results were interpreted to ensure reliability of the inferential claim.
The data collection method satisfied ethical requirements. Confidentiality was
ensured for the anonymous respondents, and special permission or protection was not
necessary because I only surveyed unrestricted adult respondents in Nigeria. The internal
validity and external validity for the Likert scale ordinal measures were verified. The
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sample field was randomly distributed in the Nigerian geo-political center. The survey
instrument was the same, administered during the same time period, and respondents did
not communicate with each other. Completed surveys were collected on the spot.
The holistic education policy was targeted at general incident areas of Nigerian
population, effectively administered from the prekindergarten up to high school and
college. The hypothesis of the study was conceptually grounded in the transformational
power of (holistic) education over ignorance, as suggested by Becker, Nagler, and
Woessmann (2014); Franck and Johnson (2016); Hungerman (2014); and Lanas and
Zembylas (2015). The religious-based ideological intolerance that is fueling the BH
Islamist insurgency may become gradually neutralized if the population is holistically
reeducated or educated, deradicalized or nonradicalized, and systematically integrated
into the productive Nigerian socioeconomic and political order. This minimizes or
eliminates illiteracy as a root cause of the violent resurgence of BH in the 21st century.
Research Design and Rationale
The cross-sectional survey design was suited for this study. In the study of the
association between social support and depression in the general population or the HUNT
study, a typical or similar cross-sectional survey design has been used (Grav, Hellzen, &
Stordal, 2012). The rise of BH insurgency in Nigeria reflects unstudied approaches in the
past to negotiate peace. The Peace Project of Kano model is a nonholistic training for
violence prevention and tolerance focused on the youth population similar to some other
work with middle-schoolers (Orpinas et al.,, 1996). An attempt to establish a liberal
peace in Timor-Leste had encountered variations, ending up with a liberal local hybrid
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peace instead of a Western constitutional democracy (Wallis, 2012). The failures of the
Middle East Liberal Peace Projects over many years are common knowledge. The liberal
peace was further explained by Richmond (2005), but the BH was known for refusing
such liberal negotiations on the grounds of faith in pure Islamic Sharia law and its Jihadi
requirements. BH insurgency has no public identity or contact, which informed both the
framework and the cross-sectional survey methodology for this study.
The Cross-Sectional Design: Strengths and Limitations
The cross-sectional design method is commonly identified with survey research
and is used in the social science research (Frankfort-Nachmias & Frankfort, 2008).
Researchers can describe patterns of relationship between the variables (DV, IV), and
they use statistical analysis (cross-tabulation and bivariate percentage analysis) to control
operations built into the design. The cross-sectional design was chosen for this study
because classic experiments are not suited for social science research. The statistical
control in multiple regressions is achieved by controlling covariates. The validity tests for
this method are commonly acceptable when the methodology is properly applied.
From Kano Northern Nigeria comes the Peace Project, a nongovernmental
organization and nonmilitary experiment for youth in response to growing ethno-social
divides and festering politico-religious crises since Muhammed Marwa or Maitatsine
Islamist jihad. I included a random survey of informed respondents both male and female
with a minimum of a bachelor’s degree plus 5 years or master’s degree, across Nigerian
population. These criteria were necessary to ensure higher data validity. Respondents
received the survey instruments hand-delivered, and they returned their responses within
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the day. The responses to the Likert scaled (1 to 5) instrument were entered as the raw
survey data sets (the values of the IVs, THEP), and the covariate influences (CVn) were
coded for the SPSS analysis. The descriptive statistics and correlations result of the
ANOVA, MANCOVA, and ANCOVA were interpreted according to the research design.
Follow-up contact with respondents was not required after the data were collected and
verified. Unexplained variances may yet exist (beyond this study) to explain the BH
phenomenon.
Streamlining the Scope
Many factors influence a social phenomenon, of which only the dominant (IV)
would need to be measured by methodology and analysis to satisfactorily answer the
research questions. Limited resources and constraint on less significant variables in
human psychopathology compelled the streamlining of the scope of the study. Data
collection cost in Nigeria was relatively affordable.
The Variables
The attitudes were measured (i.e., the state of NBHR) as a function of (depends
on) many other (mediating) functions or cofactors. Further studies may account for most
of such subfunctions or covariates or unexplained influences (mediating or moderating
variables) that were beyond the necessary scope of this research study. Generally, the
model was
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Equation 1
NBHR1 = DV1 = f(fn) = f[IV1 + ( CVn)];

n = 1, 2, 3, 4, … (i.e., Neutralizing BH

Resurgence was a function of IV1, which itself was influenced (moderated) by several
CVn)
Equation 2
NBHR2 = DV2 = f(fn) = f[IV1f + (CVn)];n = 1, 2, 3, 4;
Where IV1f = IV2, as in B.(Or same as above, except here the IV2 = IV1f; f = free).
NBHR2 may be the most significant measurement in the study. DV1 measured the
effect of not-free THEP; and DV2, the free THEPf; and DV3 separately measured the
effect of THEP3f on BH recruitment pool, BHRP; the IVn (accounted for in
questionnaires) control the DVn, and are IVs and covariates. DV4 separately measured the
relationship of levels of general Western education to the BHRP; where IVn ≡ (IV1, IV2,
IV3, IV4; and IV1 & IV1f ) are covariate influences.
Answers to the research questions from DV4 to DV6 were anecdotal or for further
research studies.
Further studies shall be contrasted on a framework of simultaneously active
independent factors. In this study, it was assumed that Islamist religious fundamentalism
was driven by lack or type of education (the dominant IV). The degree or the power of
functional dependency of neutralization of a typical (BH) cyclical aggression-frustration
induced insurgency or even state counterinsurgency, varies with the factor of THEP on
incident population and duration (i.e., the contextualized, designed, diversified, and
integrated education policy applied to train the head, the heart for peace and tolerance,
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and the hands for employment). In such a model of comprehensive curriculum, it shall
encompass elements of the liberal Peace Project and more for the targeted population
throughout the pre-K up to undergraduate education. It was assumed that Nigeria would
pay for a model to prevent state failure as in the modern Almajiri schools, bearing the
character and composition of its federation, despite the global dynamics of Islamic jihadi
fundamentalism (IVs and CVs). A survey instrument was designed to measure these
variables and covariables to address all the research questions. The main question was the
THEP or free THEP effect, and reducing FSRP – how much correlation existed between
THEP and NBHR or FSRP over a predictable time period, which may be generations.
Instrumentation and Operationalization
Social scientists use scales (Likert, Guttman, etc.) and scoring techniques to
measure attitudes (DV) of respondents on research surveys or questionnaire instruments
at the nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio data levels of measurements. Scaling and
indexing are the primary methods of ordinal data collection in quantitative research
inquiry. The displayed attitudes represented sets of human behavior (thought) indicators.
They were the mixtures of interactions of composite (independent) variables or items that
possess many empirical values. The BH insurgency phenomenon in Nigeria, for example,
indicated a hard-to-measure human behavior (attitude), attributable to a complex mixture
of composite variables including history, education, economics, religion, sectarian
indoctrination, ethnicity, politics, public policy, hegemony, state of mind, location,
communication, and environment (Bernahu, 2016). Scaling and indexing reduce such
complex data to single quantitative set of scores (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 etc.), and sometimes even in

65
measurable intervals amenable to statistical analysis (using SPSS or other), which
enhances empirical validity and reliability. In designing the survey questionnaire for this
study, similar studies were referenced (HUNT’s study, PsycTESTS survey samples, etc.).
In the instrument for this study, questionnaire items 1 to 8 were exploratory and
grounding questions of the hypothesis. Questionnaire Item 9 was a measure of the
radicalization of BH insurgents, and Items 10 to 15 directly measured the six research
questions. Random survey data were collected from knowledgeable participants who had
the equivalents of graduate degree in humanities (social science, education, politics, etc.)
and were socially informed across the Nigerian population. Inferential interpretations of
multiple regression results helped to answer the research questions.
Sample Size and Data Analysis
Nunally (1978) recommended 10 times as many respondents as there were
variables. Kass and Tinsley (1979) recommended five to 10 per variable up to 300.
Considering one variable (THEP), the sample size would be 10, but with other four
significant covariates, it was (10 x 5 = 50). Scaling measurement was designed by
compiling a list of possible scale items (or questionnaire) administered to a randomly
dispersed cross-section of a large population sample of respondents to augment validity.
G*Power analysis yielded a minimum of 12 for this study, which fits the common rule of
10–15 respondents for each variable (Field, 2009). Respondents for this study typically
had commonalities of at least 0.6, which validated a sample size less than 100 for a
reliable survey study (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999). The larger the
population, the greater the scale reliability achieved; for an effect size based on detection
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probability (two-tails, α=.05, c=0.95), the sample size was 54. The minimum sample size,
n, was calculated with the statistics formula
Equation 3

n = pq {

}²

where p was the preliminary probability of success (50% if not known), and q = (1 – p),
Zc=1.96 for 95% confidence, the critical value separating right tail of normal distribution,
and E = margin of error (for this sampling E = 5 to 10% error).
I surveyed 50 to 100 respondents randomly distributed at the mixing point of the
four regions of Nigeria (capital area, Abuja) as shown in the Venn diagram. This was the
intersection of the North (i.e., far North and North Central), West, and East cells in the
Venn diagram, and it represented the cross-sectional data collection sample field
randomly dispersed for estimated an Nigerian population of 178.5 million by the World
Population Review (Drolet, 2016).
Data analysis using SPSS was used to determine relationships and correlations of
the variables to answer all of the research questions. In the data cleaning process, I
separated traceable and inconsistent survey answers or unclear coding of responses
before analysis. The data were sorted and coded from instruments to SPSS program. A
normal frequency distribution was expected (one or two-tailed) for descriptive statistics
and regression analysis (ANOVA, MANOVA, and ANCOVA), as required to validate
correlations. The survey instrument was delivered to respondents manually, at the same
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time period. It was expected that at least 50% of surveys will be returned completed and
on time. The statistical hypothesis test of mean was used (one or two-tails, α = .05, at c =
0.95) as stated.
Levels of Measurement (Operationalization of Variables)
Scientific research in social sciences involving the measurement of group or
individual attitudes are difficult to operationalize and quantify at the ratio level (i.e., the
comparison of intervals referenced to a 0 point). The BH insurgency phenomenon does
not have a clear 0 or starting point. There were no clear intervals in the continuum of the
insurgency, but good approximations were possible. In definable time and space, BH
came to public notice through their activities. Nominal level of measurement allowed for
the labeling of discrete entities like male or female and marital status of respondents in a
study. Further, I used the ranking of identifiable nominal entities (i.e., all male students
are at various levels of exposure to the Western-style education system). This is ordinal
level measurement, but did not apply to this study. Ranking of items in survey
instruments provided variable indications (as in THEP and free THEP) that were of
empirical relevance in this study. Reynolds (1971) noted that most theoretical concepts in
social science studies can be measured at the ordinal levels. There could be the possibility
of performing some measurements at the interval level. There could be some relevance in
the differences of intervals of the impacts of policies of different Nigerian political and or
military regimes during which periods (2002, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, etc.) the
development of the BH insurgency metamorphosed into a national crisis. However, this
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study was operationalized at the ordinal level for the respondents’ attitudes (IVs)
measured on the Likert-type scale survey questionnaire.
This study may be merged into a full-scale study of the multi-variables that are at
play in the scope of social dynamics that may define the violent attitudes of BH
insurgency. Such complexity may not significantly enhance the inferential results. The
BH phenomenon has developed over time from 1995 or 2002, but the terrorist trajectory
has settled so the significant variables (DVs and IVs) defined the problem. They were
variables defined by education (THEP) that theoretically leads to some behavior
modification and ERs. Politics or PC, IH, and SP were all factors theoretically grounded,
and they consisted of the impetus for BH insurgency-resurgence. To measure the effects
or DVs, the Likert-type scale with similar or different (agreement) response options was
scaled up to 5 points from lowest to highest. There may be a true 0 point depending on a
particular test (IV) question but it was assigned 1. The survey questionnaire included
questions addressing each of the six IVs for this study. The ordinal data were preceded by
nominal data in the questionnaire to assess and factor in existing respondent bias and
qualification.
Threats to Validity and Reliability
BH insurgency represents a group dynamics problem in social science: the need to
belong, to maintain uniformity, and to nurture emotions (Festinger, 1950). The difficulty
of direct contact with BH for observations or survey presents validity and reliability
challenge for a study in which such contact is an apparatus. It was not possible to survey
BH members directly for what they believe. The conceptual framework hinges on the
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effective modification of their behavior through a holistic education (Csikszentmihalyi,
2014). This called for design of the measuring instruments to make sure that the model
measured intended dependent variable (NBHR) by the IVs’ data, and then that the
measurement techniques (methodology) were valid, including a randomized sample field
of Nigerian population, people of competent knowledge of the BH phenomenon, and of
the society. The measured outcome or data must be properly analyzed with SPSS and the
results competently/correctly interpreted to ensure reliability. The survey of respondents
directly from BH insurgent community would constitute a different study. In this study,
the data represented BH attitude by measuring the attitude and experiences of people
knowledgeable and affected by their activities in Nigeria. This transitive property of
equality methodology to answer the research questions was grounded in mathematics and
ensured the validity of this study.
For internal validity, the extrinsic factors, ethics, and practicality of design
selection were controlled by the institutional review board (IRB). Intrinsic factors like
history (what happened to respondents during study that would have changed the
assumptions), maturation (i.e., respondent physiological change) during study, and
possible reactivity of respondent due to sensitization by a pretest or a posttest were
controlled by the methodology during data collection. There were no pretests and
posttests but only a pilot study. Intrinsic factors including experimental mortality (such as
respondents drop out), regression artifact (respondents with extreme bias), and reliability
of instrumentation (yielding similar results for similar conditions) were also controlled by
the methodology. The study design (sample, timing, method) accounted for these threats
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of the psychological and social changes in the respondents. Experimental mortality was
not be applicable to the study. The survey was administered only once in a short time
(about 1 hour) giving no time for the dropout of respondents. Although a change in
instrumentation was possible, and no pretest was given, the instrument design was
properly referenced and directly measured the intended variables to ensure internal
validity. A regression artifact was controlled by law of averaging or resolved by bulk
effect of a larger sample size (N = 95).
To minimize external validity issues, the cross-sectional sample field was
representative, and the survey was taken in a natural setting at the participants’ regular
workplace. Control of reactive issues of one variable on the other variables was factored
into the CVs and analysis of regression results. Research Questions 1 and 2 narrowed the
effect of other IVs on THEP and resolved some reactivity issues, but their respective
relationships to the subject NBHR were measured by Questions 3, 4, 5, and 6 that
addressed nonmilitary COIN policy in Nigeria.
Finally, content validity was controlled by ensuring that the questionnaire was
designed to directly measure the variables (DVs) and ensure face validity issue (i.e.,
researcher’s subjective evaluation of the instrument). The randomization of respondents
across the population (sample field) controlled sampling validity. To ensure predictive
validity, an external criterion, a correlation of measured responses with related studies,
was referenced in the study. Empirical validity is a measure of how the instruments (the
survey questionnaire design) were related to the measurement outcome of the instruments
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). To determine that the instrument logically and

71
empirically related to the theoretical framework of the study (ie., the construct validity),
previous and similar types of studies in literature were referenced for the research design,
data collection, and analysis. The pilot study led to minor changes in the instrument
before conducting the final survey.
Reliability
For the study to be deemed overall reliable and scholarly, the reliability of the
measuring instruments must be established. This is the alternative method to ensure
validity when the concept, empirical, and construct validities are difficult to establish
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Frankfort, 2008). The same instrument should consistently record
the same measurements for the same tests and for the same conditions at all times. This
means that the same respondent to the same survey questionnaire would always give
similar responses to similar questions and at all times during the study. In the social
sciences, measurement of feeling or attitude is usually indirect and that invites more error
than in physical sciences studies, due to distractions of respondents, poor instructions by
researcher, and technical difficulties (Frankfort-Nachmias & Frankfort, 2008). Social
behaviors are not static, and new activities in the measuring field are capable of altering
the respondent’s perception of situations being measured. This may be significant in the
resulting measurement. This would be true for measuring BH phenomenon. This threat to
reliability can be minimized with the parallel-form technique that correlates two sets of
responses from the same respondent to statistically determined similar forms. This calls
for a clear definition of the period of study and the comprehensive description of
prevailing conditions or assumptions when the surveys were administered. One form is
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the true while the other is the error component, and the results will be used to calculate
the variance, to be kept on record in the report of the results. This study was postpositivist
and did not need to perform a formal pilot study. The methodology for more in-depth
studies (outside the scope of this study) with more covariates may need a formal pilot
study.
Ethical Concerns
BH was mostly a clandestine terror group that could not be safely approached by
a researcher. Data collection and validation for this study did not call for direct contact
with the insurgents but constituted reaching appropriate respondents. In the safe areas of
the Nigerian society, no permission was needed either from government or from a parent
to reach the respondent adults. The adult respondents generally granted their informed
consent to me to participate, and they were not under any obligation to respond. The need
to minimize the cost of the study limited the depths of the research, which might have
constrained both the validity of data and the reliability of results. However, the sample
size was adequate. Because Western education had become suspect in parts of Northern
Nigeria, the anonymity and confidentiality of respondents was necessary and ensured
during data collection. They completed and submitted the surveys the same day at the
same location. The responses (or data) were kept confidential, and all respondents were
anonymous. The provision of monetary help to respondents to facilitate access to
instrument (data collection) and handling, for food and transportation was not necessary.
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Summary of Design and Methodology
The cross-sectional survey research design provided the best methodology for this
study. The moderate sample size (N = 95) was randomly selected from the cross-section
of Nigerian population at the point of intersection of the regions in Abuja, the capital city.
Participants were educated and sociologically informed. Their response (attitude) about
NBHR (DV) by THEP administered from kindergarten through college, age 21 (IV), was
measured (data). Four main moderating cofactors (CVs) were measured. A Likert-scale
survey instrument questionnaire (Appendix D) was used to collect ordinal and nominal
data at the same time. Ethical issues (risks, biases, anonymity) were controlled, and
informed consents were granted by the adult respondents. They were properly informed
of the purpose of the study. Using SPSS program for descriptive statistics and multiple
regressions (ANOVA, ANCOVA, and MANCOVA), data analyses were performed as
applicable to determine the relationships and correlations that predict the power of THEP
in NBHR, the outcome DV. The design of the instrument and research questions allowed
the choice of method of analysis (ANOVA) test for single variable outcome (DV) based
on single factor (IV), and for levels of the IV (for not-free and free THEP). The analysis
and multiple analyses of covariates (ANCOVA and MANCOVA) were based on the
hypothesis that the IV was influenced by covariables (CVs). The descriptive statistics,
with the hypothesis test and multiple regression analysis, answered all the research
questions. The focus of the study was mainly on the RQ1 or RQ2, and RQ3 (THEP and
FSRP). The same basic assumptions applied to all the regression tests, normal
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distribution, random sampling, and homogeneity, at c=0.95, and α=.05, one or two-tailed
and repeated measures.
The validity of data was ensured by instrument design, zero maturation periods in
measurement, and basic data cleaning to enhance the reliability of inferential results and
possible generalization. To limit the scope of this study, only the tests and analysis
necessary to answer the research questions satisfactorily were performed. In further
studies of this subject, more complex tests as indicated will be necessary.
In Chapter 4, I present the results of the study.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The collection, organization, treatment, and analyses of data are discussed in this
chapter. The power of the relationship between THEP in Nigeria from kindergarten to
college (age 21), and NBHR, was evaluated. THEP, the key IV, with other significant
influential predictors (covariables) were measured with a Likert-type survey instrument.
From the descriptive statistics and regression analyses, the research questions RQ1 to
RQ6 were answered, and THEP’s power (effects) on NBHR (DV1) was evaluated upon
testing the postulated directional hypotheses for the relationships. The graphs, tables, and
observed correlations of the variables are noted. The research questions were:
1. What is the relationship (power) between THEP from nursery to postsecondary
(age 21), at the presumed vulnerable incident population, and neutralizing BH resurgence
against political conspiracies, Islamic hegemony (IH), Sharia policies (SP), and economic
realities (ER) in Nigeria?
H11: The effective implementation of THEP designed for the presumed
vulnerable population of Nigeria, from nursery through first degree, over time is related
to neutralizing BH resurgence, over existing key impetuses.
H01: There is no significant relationship of THEP applied in the vulnerable areas
of Nigeria from nursery to secondary and postsecondary level, to neutralizing the BH
resurgence (NBHR).
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2. What is the relationship (power) between providing free THEP from nursery to
postsecondary (age 21), at the presumed vulnerable incident population, and neutralizing
BH resurgence against political conspiracies, IH, SP, and ERs in Nigeria?
H12: The effective implementation of free THEP designed for the presumed
vulnerable population of Nigeria, from nursery to postsecondary, is related to neutralizing
BH resurgence over moderating impetuses.
H02: There is no significant relationship of free THEP applied to the vulnerable
areas of Nigeria, from nursery to postsecondary level, to neutralizing the BH resurgence.
3. What is the relationship of free THEP throughout Nigeria to foot soldier
recruitment pools (FSRP) of BH insurgency within the Nigerian Islamic population?
H13: THEP implemented throughout Nigeria is related to diminishing (drying up)
the recruitment pools of the BH insurgency.
H03: Diminishing the recruitment pools of the BH insurgency is not significantly
related to implementing THEP throughout Nigeria.
4. What is the relationship of BH insurgency recruitment pool to the type, level,
and quality of education attained by its foot soldiers in Nigeria?
H14: BH insurgency recruitment may be related to the level of Western education
attained by its foot soldiers.
H04: BH insurgency recruitment is not significantly related to the level of Western
education attained by its foot soldiers.
5. What is the relationship of BH insurgency recruitment pools to the employment
status (economic realities) of its foot soldiers in Nigeria?
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H15: Employment status is related to the BH foot soldiers pool.
H05: Employment status is not related to BH foot soldiers pool.
6. What is the relationship of BH insurgency recruitment pool to the Islamic
fundamentalist radicalization of its foot soldiers?
H16: Islamic fundamentalist radicalization is related to the BH foot soldier pool.
H06: Islamic fundamentalist radicalization is not related to the BH foot soldier
pool.
Relationships of the variables were determined by analyzing participants’
responses to the random cross-sectional survey (at the ordinal level) of native population
measured on Likert scales. The descriptive statistics calculated the mean, mode, range,
and deviations for each variable predictor.
In the survey instrument (questionnaire), items coded S1 to S15 were ordinal
measures, and the letters A, B, C, and D represented more nominal measures. S10 and
S12 were research questions RQ1 and RQ3. RQ2 was a stratified RQ1 that measured the
free-THEP hypothesis. RQ4, RQ5 and RQ6, corresponded to S13, S14, and S15,
respectively, representing the predictors of S12 or RQ3, which was another measure of
power of THEP to NBHR hypothesis, by drying up the FSRP. The mean S6 was another
measure of drying up FSRP, and it depended on predictor S12 (THEP = IV3) and
covariates, CV3a, CV3b, and CV3c. The different associations of the relationships RQ1
to RQ3, and RQ3 to RQ4, RQ4, and RQ6, expanded the dimensions of the study by
incorporating more influential factors. The six research questions were preliminarily
answered by the analyses of descriptive statistics, and they may inform on the power
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(level) of the relationship between NBHR and THEP. Correlations from ANOVA and
ANCOVA, MANOVA, and MANCOVA (for DV1, DV3, combined effects) regression
analyses based on the models would quantify the amount contributed by each variable to
the variability in the outcomes.
The hypotheses focus was that THEP (IV1) effects neutralizing of Nigerian BH
resurgence (DV1 or NBHR), or drying up the FSRP (DV3). The outcome DV1 or DV3
was likely influenced by many covariates, beside CV3a, CV3b, and CV3c in the study.
The outcomes DV1, DV3, directly (S10) and indirectly (S12) were survey data mean
measures 3.65 and 3.49, respectively, and they reflected participants’ perception of the
effect of THEP to NBHR. The averaging of these two means may better reflect
perception or outcome DV1 for THEPdirect (or DV1thep), while the averaging of means
related to FSRP for S13, S14, and S15 measures DV3 for THEPindirect (or DV3fsrp). The
aggregation of DV1 and DV3 was valuable because both measured the same outcome of
NBHR in two different ways. DV3 was an outcome to be predicted mainly by S13, S14,
and S15, plus other unknown influences assumed to be significant for this study.
According to the conceptual framework of this study, illiteracy and type and quality of
education borne in ideological impetuses were higher driving root causes of the
insurgency than the ERs. It follows from the design and survey results, that it is
reasonable in terms of dependent (outcome) and independent variability to simplify these
outcomes as
Equation 4
DV1 =

(

),

and

DV3 = (

)
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Equation 3
Where, IV1 = S10; IV3 = S12, and IV4 = S13, IV5 = S14, and IV6 = S15, which give the
values
DV1thep = (3.65 + 3.49)/2 = 3.57, DV3fsrp = (3.44 + 3.03 + 3.76)/3 = 3.41.
Although these averages of survey means suggested the likelihood of a good
relationship, how the predictors are correlated (the effect sizes) and significance was
examined by regression analyses. If simplified, the means (data), reflect overall
perception of participants, or
Equation 5
DV1 = MeanIV1;

DV3 = MeanIV3; i.e. DV1 = MeanS10, and DV3 = MeanS12

Within the framework, Regressions 1, 2, 3, to 7 analyses, following the tests of
hypotheses, were limited to measuring the correlations between, first, the scaled survey
Item B, or participant education level, and participants’ political region of Nigeria, Item
C (ANOVA). Second, DV1 dependent on IV1 and cofactors-existing education policy
(CV1) and IH (CV2); and third, DV3 dependent on IV3 and cofactors -level and quality
of Western education of foot soldiers (CV3a), their ERs (CV3b), and Islamic
fundamentalism and radicalization (CV3c) - (see the SPSS analyses/outputs below).
Multiple Regression Analyses
Generally, a multiple (linear) regression equation model is represented in the form
Equation 6
y=

+

+

+…+

+ ,
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Where

,

,

,…

are the IVs, b is y-intercept (Constant), and y is the DV; m-

values are the coefficients (or slopes, B or b-values) of linear functional relations, or
change in y for a unit change in x, holding all other independent variables constant.
In this study, based on the design of the survey instrument (questionnaire), I
determined and assigned the outcome y = DV1 = S10,
S15, and

= S13,

= S14,

= S9,

=

= S6, etc. However, DV1f or DV2 (measure of free THEP) depended on the

same variables as DV1. NBHR was reflected by mean response to S12 (THEP based on
drying up the FSRP) or DV3 dependent on the S13, S14, and S15 variables. Rewriting
the regression equations in terms of S-values from data
Equation 7
DV1 = S10 =

S13 +

S14 +

S9 +

S15 +

S6 + b

and
Equation 8
DV3 = S12 =

S13 +

S14 +

S15 + b

The analyses of variances (ANOVA) based on Equations 8 and 9 were performed
using SPSS, for outcomes dependent on applicable predictor variables. To measure
NBHR based on THEP (S10), for example, would be dependent on predictors, illiteracy
(S13), ERs (S14), political conspiracy of the IH (S9), religious extremism (S15), and
maybe FSRP (S6). The regression analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) involving the
covariate influences and predictor variables may be modeled as follows:
Equation 9
DV1 = IV1 + CV1 + CV2
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Equation 10
DV3 = IV3 + CV31 + CV32 + CV33
Pilot Study
A preliminary survey (pilot) was conducted in the four subregions of Northern
Nigeria about o1 year prior to the final survey of August, 2018. The sample size, N = 26,
was randomly distributed. Fifteen or 58% of respondents had earned at least a bachelor’s
degree plus 10 years or a master’s degree of education (in various disciplines); eight or
31% indicated they had not, while three or 11% did not answer to that survey item. The
output data from SPSS analysis was tabulated in the following descriptive statistics and
discussed.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics (Pilot Study)
Mean

1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12
S13
S14
S15

4.31
2.77
4.50
2.69
3.88
4.16
3.08
3.58
4.15
3.73
3.69
3.19
3.31
3.19
4.23

Median Mode

5.00
2.00
5.00
2.00
4.00
5.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
3.50
3.50
3.00
3.00
3.00
4.00

Std.
Variance Minimum Maximum
Deviation
5
1
5
2
5
5
2
5
5
3
3
3
3
3
4

1.258
1.773
0.949
1.436
1.211
1.463
1.412
1.501
1.347
0.919
0.884
0.981
1.050
1.132
0.908

1.582
3.145
0.900
2.062
1.466
2.140
1.993
2.254
1.815
0.845
0.782
0.962
1.102
1.282
0.825

1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
1

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
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Seven respondents indicated that they came from North-Central (NC), five from
the Northwest (NW), nine from Northeast (NE), and five from the Middle belt (M). All
but three indicated that they were non-Muslim. Those three did not respond to the item on
religious identity in the pilot survey–“Are you Muslim?” The survey was anonymous.
The results (raw completed survey) were scanned and e-mailed to me by two partners,
one was a university professor, and the other a retired senior civil servant (mechanical
engineer) with graduate degree. The results of the analysis of the pilot study, with the
comments of the dissertation committee, and of the university research reviewer and the
Walden University IRB, informed my decision to review and revise elements of the final
survey instrument questionnaire items. I moved the survey sample field to the center of
Nigeria, capital city, Abuja (the intersection) where all regions and religions of Nigeria
and the demographic distributions were more fairly representative and in accordance with
the cross-sectional design sample field and framework of the study.
Data Collection
I traveled to Abuja City in Nigeria early July 2018 to the location of the sample
field. I discussed the consent form with the head of the institutions. In a phone conference
with the responsible authorities of the various campuses, I took time to answer their
questions, and I explained both the confidentiality and the anonymity provided for and
required in the process. The authority pledged their full cooperation for randomized data
collection from the various education campuses spread out in the city, among their
diverse, educated, and experienced academic and administrative staff (for K-12). I did not
provide any financial incentive for their cooperation and participation. Upon the IRB
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approval of the consent form, August 20, 2018, I returned to the sample site in Abuja.
The participants completed the survey on August 21, 2018. The participants who had
willingly and freely received the instruments returned them completed or uncompleted
the same day to a designated place, anonymously. The authority cooperated with me in
the process of the distribution and collection of survey instruments.
Of about100 survey instruments returned, 95 were fully and properly completed
to ensure the validity of the study. This was about a 95% return rate, better than about
50% return expected. The authorities of the various campuses facilitated the completion
of the process within 24 hours. In that regard, I was practically limited as planned to
personally hand out the surveys to the participants.
The academic and administrative staff of the sample field had earned at least a
bachelor’s degree. From the frequency distribution and for the (N = 95) participants who
responded to the Survey Item B, about 50.5% indicated they had earned at least a
bachelor’s degree plus 5 years working experience or a master’s degree (in various fields
of study). It was expected, based on the institution’s basic requirement, that the 27.4%,
besides the 50.5%, may have earned at least a bachelor degree but less than 5 years of
experience. The 22.1% who skipped that survey item may have left it blank because they
did not meet the specified 5-year minimum experience, but would have earned at least a
bachelor degree. It was reasonable, for validity, that I only surveyed a knowledgeable
sample who would have understood the framework linking education and insurgency. It
is not an elite class.
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The sample field was randomly chosen and included male and female participants
who were indigenes of various political regions of Nigeria and from various religious
backgrounds. The distribution is shown on the chart, Item C of the survey. The
representations, East 47.4%, Middle Belt 12.6%, North 4.2%, and West 20%, fairly
reflected the city demographics of educated degree holders employed in the private
education industry, because the federal character quota system did not apply to private
schools. The figures were fairly correlated with national literacy statistics (NBS, 2014).
The pilot study did not identify Muslim participants. The final survey was revised to take
care of the apparent bias. The demographic distribution of the final survey, based on the
sample field, would have included a few Muslim participants, which enhanced the
validity of the data. Covariates IL, PC (IH), ER, and RE were identified in the analysis.
Treatment and/or Intervention Fidelity
I had expected some survey instruments to be returned not meeting the minimum
requirement for acceptability into the database. Examination of survey entries resulted in
discarding about three returns that had many voids, multiple entries to one item, or
combination of errors and voids, especially where the void included Item D on attestation
that survey questions were answered honestly and truly. This was part of the data
cleaning process. The coding and entry of data were performed manually and processed
into an Excel spreadsheet. Variables (S#) were defined for SPSS analysis. I will keep the
raw data for at least 5 years.
There was no adverse event requiring intervention. I consulted with experts in
statistical analysis before analyzing with the SPSS. I designed the regression models to
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ensure good output and measurement and for correct interpretations to enhance the
reliability of results.
Results
The means of the participants’ responses to research questions, RQ1 (S10),
reflected their perception (or the relationship) of THEP in the hypothesis, from nursery to
postsecondary or college (age 21), to NBHR, the outcome variable, DV1 from the
descriptive statistics. RQ2 (S11) or free THEP was measured. RQ3, RQ4, RQ5, and RQ6
were equally measured, along with other predictor variables in the framework. Their
correlations were studied in the regression analyses of the data using SPSS. Drying up the
FSRP of BH insurgency using THEP, its relationship to the level of Western education
attained by its foot soldiers (IV4), the employment status (or economic realities) of its
foot soldiers, and Islamic fundamentalist radicalization were measured. The postulate was
that zero foot soldier probably means end of resurgence. The six research questions were
constituted in the items for the respondents amidst the 19 survey items that included other
predictors and exploratory questions. Four survey items were nominal and 15 ordinals having no true 0; minimum score was 1, and maximum was 5. Range = 5 - 1 = 4.
The survey was designed so the average (mean) of participants’ responses
reflected their perception of (or answer to) the research questions RQ1 coded S10, RQ2, a
stratified form of RQ1 coded S11; RQ3 was S12; RQ4 = S13; RQ5 = S14; and RQ6 =
S15, respectively.
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Descriptive Statistics
Table 2
Frequency Distribution

A (Should BH end the
insurgency …?
N
Y
B (Have you earned at least
a bachelor plus 5 years…?
N
Y
Not indicated
C (You belong in this old
political region of Nigeria).
E
M
NN
W
D (responded honestly).
Y

Frequency

Percent

6
68

6.3
71.6

26
48
21

27.4
50.5
22.1

45
12
4
19

47.4
12.6
4.2
20.0

86

90.5

In the survey data, 48 participants (50.5%, for N = 95) indicated that they earned
at least a bachelor plus 5 years of experience or master’s degree (Table 2). In addition, 45
participants (47.4%) belonged in the Eastern region of Nigeria, 68 participants or 71.6%
indicated that BH should end the insurgency and live peaceably in a secular Nigeria,
6.3% said no, and 21 (22.1%) did not respond. I found that 86 participants (90.5%)
indicated that they had responded to all items honestly and truly, while the rest did not
respond to the item D.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
*
Range

Min

Max

Mean

Std

Variance

Skewness

Stat

Stat

Stat

Stat

4

1

5

4

1

4

Kurtosis

S.E.

Stat

Stat

Stat

S.E.

Stat

S.E.

3.96

.144

1.406

1.977

-1.214

.247

.104

.490

5

3.40

.147

1.407

1.979

-.485

.251

-.994

.498

1

5

3.66

.135

1.298

1.685

-.611

.250

-.708

.495

4

1

5

4.00

.114

1.111

1.234

-.904

.247

-.179

.490

4

1

5

3.81

.126

1.218

1.484

-.910

.250

-.031

.495

4

1

5

4.11

.102

.989

.978

-1.036

.249

.411

.493

4

1

5

3.84

.125

1.223

1.496

-.760

.247

-.580

.490

4

1

5

4.20

.113

1.097

1.204

-1.543

.247

1.68

.490

Mode
5
S1
5
S2
5
S3
5
S4
5
S5
5
S6
5
S7
5
S8

6
5
S9

4

1

5

3.87

.105

1.024

1.048

-.714

.247

-.299

.490

4

1

5

3.65

.114

1.100

1.210

-.404

.250

-.589

.495

4

1

5

3.57

.106

1.020

1.040

-.181

.251

-.802

.498

4

1

5

3.49

.116

1.114

1.242

-.143

.251

-.803

.498

4

1

5

3.44

.098

.953

.909

-.471

.247

.286

.490

4

1

5

3.03

.115

1.112

1.236

.032

.249

-.621

.493

4

1

5

3.76

.113

1.074

1.153

-.830

.254

.218

.503

4
S1
0
3a
S1
1
4
S1
2
3
S1
3
3a
S1
4
3
S1
5

Note. a. Multiple modes exist,

variables

the smallest value is shown. *S1, S2, S3 … S15 are predictor
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Assumptions
The assumption of normality (normal distribution) shall be satisfied to conduct a
multiple regression analysis. A few distribution histograms were not normal, so that a
one-tailed analysis was used. Homogeneity of variances or the variance of each variable
was constant for all levels. Independence of participants and outcome variables (DV1,
DV3) was included, so no participant is influenced by another, and outcome variables
come from separate entities (Field, 2009). The skewness and kurtosis for normal
variables were within the range of -2 through +2. The sample was random and did not
show multicollinearity, or IVs highly correlated with each other (concurrence). I
determined no multicollinearity by inspecting tolerance and variance inflation factor
(VIF) values and testing the validity of the assumptions in regression analyses. VIF
values (<3) indicate low correlation among variables - required. The VIF values are less
than 3. Homoscedasticity was assessed (to test for same or closely the same) variances at
levels of predictors (Forced Entry ANOVA & ANCOVA).
Findings Basic from Descriptive Statistics
Survey data analysis showed on stringed nominal items, A, about 72% of
respondents wanted BH to stop the insurgency and integrate into Nigerian secular
society, and only about 6% said not so. S1 had a high mean of 3.96 (about 74% mostly
agreed) with a range from 1 to 5 (median= 5, mode = 5, SD = 1.40, variance = 1.977). S2
mean was 3.40 (about 60% agreed or partly agreed) same range (median = 4, mode = 5,
SD=1.40, variance = 1.979). S3 mean was 3.66 (66.5% mostly agreed) same range
(median = 4, mode = 5, SD = 1.29, variance = 1.68).

89
S4 had a high mean of 4.00 (75% agreed) range 1 to 5 (median = 4, mode = 5, SD
= 1.11, variance = 1.23). S5 had a high mean score of 3.81 (70.3% mostly agreed) the
same range (median = 4, mode = 5, SD = 1.21, variance =1.48). S6 high mean score was
4.11 (77.8% agreed or strongly agreed) same range (median = 4, mode = 5, SD = 0.98,
variance = 0.97).
S7 high mean was 3.84 (71% mostly agreed), range 1 to 5 (median = 4, mode = 5,
SD = 1.22, variance =1.49). S8 mean was 4.20 (80% agreed or strongly agreed), with
same range (median =5, mode = 5, SD = 1.09, variance = 1.20). S9 mean was 3.87
(71.8% mostly agreed) with a range of scores from 1 to 5 (median = 4, mode = 4, SD =
1.02, variance = 1.04).
S10 had a high mean of 3.65 (about 66.3% mostly agreed) with a range 1 to 5
median = 4, mode = 3, SD = 1.10, variance = 1.21 (i.e., (3.65-1)/(5 – 1) x 100% =
66.3%). S11 mean was 3.57 (about 64.3% mostly agreed), range 1 to 5 (median = 4,
mode = 4, SD = 1.02, variance = 1.04). S12 mean was 3.49 (about 62.3% agreed or partly
agreed) with same range (median = 3, mode = 3, SD = 1.11, variance = 1.24). S13 mean
was 3.44 with range of scores 1 to 5 (median = 3, mode = 3, SD = 0.95, variance = 0.90).
S14 had a high mean score of 3.03 (50.8% disagreed or partly agreed lowest) with a
range of scores from 1 to 5 (median = 3, mode = 3, SD = 1.11, variance = 1.23). S15 had
a high mean score of 3.76 (69% mostly agreed) with a range of scores from 1 to 5
(median = 4, mode = 4, SD = 1.07, variance = 1.15).

90
Findings Related to Research Questions
The SPSS analyses assumed normal distribution, no multicollinearity,
homoscedasticity, and no skewness and kurtosis. The IV and DV plots were in the normal
range of -2 through +2, within the limits of the probability of outputs, so that the findings
on the research questions and hypotheses under good validity were deemed reliable.
For RQ1 and H11: S10 (RQ1) had high mean of 3.65 with a range of scores from
1 to 5 (median = 4, modes = 3, 4; SD = 1.10, variance = 1.21). Of 93, 25 participants
(26.9%) strongly agreed, 27 participants (29%) agreed, 27 participants (29%) partly
agreed, 11 disagreed, and only three strongly disagreed. Therefore, considering the
limitations of the study, most participants in the survey (85%) thought that effective
implementation of THEP on the presumed incident population of Nigeria, from nursery
through the first degree (age 21), over (unknown) time (was related to NBHR), over
existing key impetuses. The mean (3.65 or the averaged mean 3.57) was the outcome
DV1 (NBHR) from the measure of IV1 or average (IV1 + IV3)/2. This measure of
perception may directly reflect the power of THEP in the hypothesis.
The probability (or power) of THEP to NBHR in the sample may be better
estimated by the mean-value, 3.65 or 3.57 {[i.e., (3.57-1) ÷ (5-1) x 100] % = (2.57/4)
x100 = 64.25%}, if the correlation of outcome to predictor(s) was not significant (at p <
.05) in the regression model. The R squared values for the model represented the amount
of variation accounted for by the model based on all the assumptions for the test of
hypothesis being met, which was case for the model. Several regression models were
tested for the hypotheses.
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Table 4
Frequency Distribution–S10
Valid
1
2
3
4
5

Frequency
3
11
27
27
25

Percent
3.2
11.8
29.0
29.0
26.9

For RQ2 and H12: S11 (RQ2), the mean was 3.57, range 1 to 5 (median = 4, mode
= 4, SD = 1.02, variance = 1.04). Of 92, 19 participants (20.7%) strongly agreed, 30
(32.6%) agreed, and 28 (30.4%) partly agreed. Most participants (83.7%) thought
effective implementation of free THEP is related to NBHR. The difference between
THEP and free THEP was not significant.
Table 5
Frequency Distribution–S11

Valid

1
2
3
4
5

Frequency
1
14
28
30
19

Percent
1.1
15.2
30.4
32.6
20.7

For RQ3 and H13: S12 mean was 3.49 same range 1 to 5 (median = 3, mode = 3,
SD = 1.11, variance = 1.24). Of 92, 22 participants (23.9%) strongly agreed, 21 (22.8%)
agreed, 32 (34.8%) partly agreed on S12. Most participants (about 81.5%) thought that
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THEP, if it were effectively targeted and implemented throughout Nigeria, was related to
drying up the FSRP for BH.
Table 6
Frequency Distribution–S12

Valid

1
2
3
4
5

Frequency
3
14
32
21
22

Percent
2.8
13.0
29.6
19.4
20.4

For RQ4 and H14: S13 mean was 3.44, same range 1 to 5 (median = 3, mode = 3,
SD = 0.95, variance = 0.90). Of 95, 11 participants (11.6%) strongly agreed, 36 (37.9%)
agreed, and 36 (37.9%) partly agreed on S13. Most participants (about 87.4%) thought
BH recruitment pools was related to the level of Western education attained by its foot
soldiers. Illiteracy was likely a significant impetus (a reason) for insurgents to enlist as
BH foot soldiers. The regression analysis tested how this correlated with the outcome,
neutralizing BH resurgence (NBHR).
Table 7
Frequency Distribution –S13

Valid

1
2
3
4
5

Frequency
4
8
36
36
11

Percent
4.2
8.4
37.9
37.9
11.6
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For RQ5 and H15: S14 mean was 3.03, same range 1 to 5 (median = 3, mode = 3,
SD = 1.11, variance = 1.23). Of 94, 10 participants (10.6%) strongly agreed, 21 (22.3%)
agreed, and 33 (35.1%) partly agreed on S14. A third agreed or strongly agree, a third
partly agreed, and a third disagreed or strongly disagreed ERs were the impetus.
Participants were split on the relationship of ERs to BH foot soldiers recruitment pools
than on any of the other impetuses. Its lowest mean (3.03) tended towards disagreement,
as the study postulated.
Table 8
Frequency Distribution – S14

Valid

1
2
3
4
5

Frequency
8
22
33
21
10

Percent
8.5
23.4
35.1
22.3
10.6

For RQ6 and H16: S15 mean was 3.76 same range 1 to 5 (median = 4, mode = 4,
SD = 1.07, variance = 1.15). Of 90, 23 participants (25.6%) strongly agreed, 38 (42.2%)
agreed, 17 (18.9%) partly agreed, eight (8.9%) disagreed, and four (4.4%) strongly
disagreed. Therefore, 86.7% of the participants thought sustenance of BH FSRP was
more related to the Islamic fundamentalism and radicalization. In addition, 13.3%
disagreed or strongly disagreed. This result supported the theoretical and conceptual
framework of the study on ideology.
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Table 9
Frequency Distribution – S15

Valid

1
2
3
4
5

Frequency
4
8
17
38
23

Percent
4.4
8.9
18.9
42.2
25.6

Slightly skewed left, so 1tailed test applies. No
kurtosis. But normal
distribution is illustrated in
the P-P plots, page 161,
Regression 5.

Figure 3. Distributions graphs.
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Because of the sample size and (fairly stratified) sample field, these results were
hard to generalize. However, simplifying the statistics (Equation 4), by averaging the
means of key predictor (THEP) variables (IVs), the corresponding outcomes (DV =
NBHR) based on the data may give better results for participants’ perceptions (outcomes
or answers to research questions), than the single variable means; until the variables were
regressed for specific coefficients/effects:
DV1 =

(

DV3 = (

)= (

) = (3.65+3.49)/2 = 3.57;
) = (3.44+3.03+3.76)/3 = 3.41 as previously

noted.
THEP measures (S10 = 3.65, S12 = 3.49) were reflective of the NBHR, per
alternative hypotheses, H11, H13; or the alternative mean values, 3.57, 3.41, provided
answers to the research questions RQ1 and RQ3, and estimated power of THEP on
NBHR, at 64.25% and 60.25%, respectively for DV1 and DV3. The relationship and
effect sizes of the variables were determined by further analyzing various models of
regression statistics to test the hypotheses and validity of the assumptions, especially that
the null hypothesis was not true.
Regression Analyses
To determine if the outcome could be sufficiently predicted by the descriptive
statistical mean, a regression analysis was required to find the best models of measured
linear predictors that will provide maximum correlation with the outcomes, based on
correct assumptions. These assumptions are verifiable by the test of hypotheses for the
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predicted outcome using regression analysis. Correlations of the predictors are
determined by the same one or multiple regression analyses. Based on the design and
collected data, ANOVA, ANCOVA, and MANCOVA were conducted, following several
exploratory (learning) tests, necessitated by the complexity of the social phenomenon
under study (i.e., insurgency, COIN, and neutralizing resurgence).
Following the instrument design, the measure of the power (effect) of THEP on
NBHR or S10 was the outcome that corresponded to or was dependent on predictor S12
(drying up the recruitment pools), Regression 2, and other models on ANCOVA,
MANCOVA, hierarchical and forced entry analyses.
Regression 1: Education Level B, and the Old Political Region of Nigeria C
An exploratory model of multiple regression analysis was conducted to study the
correlation between Western education level attained by respondents and their old
political region of Nigeria on NBHR. Multiple regression analysis is most appropriate to
measuring the impact of two or more IVs on a DV. BH resurgence festered in
educationally backward Northern Nigeria. Education level (β = 0.806, p < 0.001) was
related to NBHR. The model accounted for 69.2% of the variance (the variation in
NBHR). And following the general regression equation (8), then
Equation 11
NBHR = B + C
(NBHR = DV, B and C are treated as predictor variables IVs, see Tables 9 & 10 below)
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Table 10
Regression 1 Coefficients Education Level

Model
1
(Constant)
Education
Level
Region

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
.228
.095
.860
.059

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

.092

.047

.806

t
2.404
14.653

Sig.
.018
.000

.107

1.953

.053

Table 11
R Square Regression 1

Model R
1
.832a

Adjusted R
R Square Square
.692
.686

Std. Error of
the Estimate
.51757

This model did not address the key IVs central to this study. It was imperative to
test the hypotheses for the research questions with other regression models.
Regression 2: Outcome as Function of THEP
Following the findings of the exploratory regression analyses above, a univariate
analysis was conducted (on SPSS) for the outcome S10, dependent on dry up the FSRP,
S12, to test the hypothesis of the power of THEP to NBHR, based on the study design
and framework, and based on this model (from equation 1):
DV1 = f(IV1),

or

S10 = S12

A hierarchical regression (ANOVA) was conducted. The results are shown partly
in Tables 11 through 14 below. The constant B, and the slope (b-value) of the regression
model equation, 1.861, and .508 were calculated, so that
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Equation 12
DV1 = f (IV1) or generally, y = bX + B,

where predictor X = S12, i.e.

NBHR (DV1 or S10) = .508(S12) + 1.861
Equation 13
Or NBHR (S10mean) = .508(S12mean) + 1.861
The standardized model (Mean = 0, and SD = 1) had a positive slope of .516, and
confidence interval [.329, .686],
Equation 14
NBHR = .516(S12)
From Table 13, 27% (r2 = .266) of variance of NBHR was likely due to THEPS12 or THEP effect on FSRP. F-test gave F(1, 88) = 31.97, p < .01, t test gave t(88) =
5.654, p < .01. The larger t = 5.654 and smaller significance (p < .001), mean a greater
contribution of predictor S12 to NBHR. The correlation coefficient (r = .516, p < .001)
was significant and suggested that drying up FSRP was relatively strongly related to
NBHR (large effect). The model was significantly good to predict NBHR. The hypothesis
may not hold up at p ≥ .05 and the C.I. does not include 0. For this analysis, there was
large positive correlation between S10 and S12, significant at p < .001 and no
multicollinearity because Pearson correlation .516 ≤ r < .9. Exactly the same variance
was seen for residuals at each level, and large eigenvalue to small variance proportion
(see Table 14) suggested there were no heteroscadasticity (existence of differences of
variances at the levels of predictor measurement). Multicollinearity was not observed, for
this model.
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Table 12
Regression 2 Coefficients; Confidence Interval 95%
Model

UC
SE
.329

SC Beta

1 (Constant)

B
1.861
.508

.090

.516

S12

t

Sig.

5.656

.000

5.654

.00
0
Note. UC = Unstandardized coefficient; SC = Standardized coefficients

Table 13
Correlations: Outcome (S10=NBHR-THEP) and Predictor (S12=THEP-FSRP)

S10

S12

Pearson Correlation, R

S10

1.000

.516

Sig. (1-tailed)

S12
S10

.516
.

1.000
.000

S12

.000

.

Table 14
R Square and Change Statistics
Model

1

R

.516a

R
Square

Adjusted
R
Square

.266

.258

Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
.953

Change Statistics
R
F
Square
Change
Change
.266
31.967

df1

df2

Sig. F
Change

1

88

.000
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Table 15
Collinearity Diagnostics
Model

Dimension

Eigenvalue

Condition
Index

1

1
2

1.952
.048

1.000
6.398

Variance
Proportions
(Constant) S12
.02
.02
.98
.98

Note. a. Dependent Variable: S10

Regression 3: Univariate Analysis of Covariance Hierarchical Regression
Equation 15
DV (S6) = IV (S12) + CV (S13) + CV (S14) + CV (S15)
S12 was a measure of THEP by drying up FSRP; S6 measured that insurgency
cannot be sustained without the foot soldiers. S6 is a function of S12, and it may have
been influenced by the covariates S13, S14, and S15. An ANCOVA may be conducted if
regression slopes are homogeneous, as shown in Table 15. The interaction of the
predictor and covariates, S12xS13xS14xS15, in the test of homogeneity for regression
slopes below was not significant at p < .05, showing F(5, 72) = .742, (p = .595), the
assumption of homogeneity of slopes is good when this test is not significant at the p
<.05 (Field, 2009). ANCOVA can be conducted for the factors (model) specified, and the
covariates will help in predicting the outcome (S6) that BH insurgency cannot be
sustained without the foot soldiers (fighters, suicide bombers, etc.), the independent
factor being THEP (S12).
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Table 16
Test of Homogeneity of Regression Slopes
Variable
Corrected Model
Intercept
S12(THEP/Foot
Soldier)
S13(Illiteracy)
S14(Economic
Realities)
S15(Religious
Extremism)
S12 * S13 * S14 * S15

Type III Sum
of Squares
20.037a
1.539
4.432

Mean Square

F

Sig.

1.670
1.539
1.108

1.780
1.640
1.181

.068
.204
.326

.010
.011

.010
.011

.010
.011

.919
.916

1.219

1.219

1.300

.258

3.480

.696

.742

.595

Table 17
Parameter Estimates: Dependent Variable: S6 = (Foot Soldier Recruitment Pool)
Parameter

B

Std.

t

Error

95% C.I.
Sig.

Partial

Observed

Eta

Powerb

LB

UB

Squared

Intercept

3.246

.708

4.586

.000

1.837

4.655

.215

.995

S13

-.008

.133

-.058

.954

-.273

.257

.000

.050

S14

.119

.117

1.015

.313

-.114

.351

.013

.171

S15

.240

.100

2.404

.019

.041

.438

.070

.661

[S12=1]

.038

.619

.061

.951

-1.195

1.270

.000

.050

[S12=2]

-.893

.383

-2.330

.022

-1.657

-.130

.066

.633

[S12=3]

-.453

.313

-1.450

.151

-1.075

.169

.027

.299

[S12=4]

-.573

.308

-1.859

.067

-1.187

.041

.043

.451

[S12=5]

0a

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Note. a. This parameter is redundant, set to 0. b. Power computed using alpha = .05
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Based on the b-values (B), Table 16, the difference in means from S6 were not
significant for S13 and S14, but were for S15. Negative values indicated direction of
relationship between S6 and the covariates. Other variables being constant, a unit
increase in the outcome S6 means a decrease in covariate S13 by .008, and increases in
S14 and S15 by .119 and .240, respectively; S13 may be nonhomogeneous. S14 differed
significantly to S12 (p = .022), just as S15 to S6. If effect was significant, p < .05 (see
Table 15), then the assumption of homogeneity of the regression slopes was untenable,
and this was not the case for the covariates, S13, S14, and S15.
In Table 17, the partial eta squared value, η², tells that when covariate is constant,
what proportion of variance of the factor S6 (DV) is related to S12 (IV), the predictor. 0
≤ η² ≤ 1 (.01=small; .06=medium; .14=large, values). Main effect is the η² associated
with the factor. This means variance of S6 may be unrelated to S12 as S13 η² = .000 is
neutral, with small power .05, but it was unclear because it was not significant for p ˃.05
(p = .954). For S15, the case was different, and it was fairly related with fairly moderate
effect, η² = .07. For the corrected model, all the covariates were significant at F(1, 77), p
<.05, p = .02, and if controlled, were fairly related to the variance in S6. Of the 87.576
variation, 71.019 of error, was unexplained. The model accounted for 16.56 of variation;
for S13 = .003, S14 = .951, S15 = 5.332, and S12 = 6.654.
In Table 18, for p ˃.05, effect was not significant, at F(4, 77), p = .137, and η² =
.086, assuming homogeneity, and covariates effect for eta = .086. F-ratio tests the effect
of S12, based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated
marginal means. Pairwise comparison tests in Table 19 showed all factors not significant
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at p < .05, at p = .783, p = .994, and p = .979, respectively, between predictor and each
covariate. CIs included 0; significant differences in the means on the parameter estimates
had disappeared in the pairwise adjusted means comparison test. Homogeneity in the
model still held, as p ˃.05, in all paired relationships. Overall, this was not a good
regression model for prediction of the outcome.
Table 18
Covariates Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: S6.
Variable
Type III
df
Mean
Sum of
Square
Squares
Corrected
16.558a
7
2.365
Model
Intercept
20.461
1
20.461
S13
.003
1
.003
S14
.951
1
.951
S15
5.332
1
5.332
S12
6.654
4
1.663
Error
71.019
77
.922
Note. a. R Squared = .189 (Adjusted R Squared = .115)

F

Sig.

Partial Eta
Squared

2.565

.020

.189

22.185
.003
1.031
5.781
1.803

.000
.954
.313
.019
.137

.224
.000
.013
.070
.086

Table 19
Effect of Predictor Factor S12
Source
Contrast
Error

Sum of
Squares
6.654
71.019

df
4
77

Mean
Square
1.663
.922

F

Sig.

1.803

.137

Partial Eta
Squared
.086

The F tests the effect of S12. This test was based on the linearly independent
pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means.
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Table 20
Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Difference, and Confidence Interval
(I)
S12

(J)
S12

Mean
Differ. (I-J)

Std.
Error

Sig.a

95% Confidence Interval
for Differencea
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
1
2
.931
.627
.783
-.876
2.738
3
.491
.585
.994
-1.195
2.177
4
.611
.609
.979
-1.144
2.366
5
.038
.619
1.000
-1.746
1.822
2
1
-.931
.627
.783
-2.738
.876
3
-.440
.344
.899
-1.432
.552
4
-.320
.373
.993
-1.395
.754
5
-.893
.383
.203
-1.998
.212
3
1
-.491
.585
.994
-2.177
1.195
2
.440
.344
.899
-.552
1.432
4
.120
.293
1.000
-.724
.964
5
-.453
.313
.806
-1.354
.448
4
1
-.611
.609
.979
-2.366
1.144
2
.320
.373
.993
-.754
1.395
3
-.120
.293
1.000
-.964
.724
5
-.573
.308
.500
-1.461
.315
5
1
-.038
.619
1.000
-1.822
1.746
2
.893
.383
.203
-.212
1.998
3
.453
.313
.806
-.448
1.354
4
.573
.308
.500
-.315
1.461
Note. Based on estimated marginal means a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons:
Sidak.
Regression 4 (Forced Entry)-DV3: THEP-on-FSRP Equation (9) – ANOVA

Equation 16
Outcome (DV3) = S12 =

S13 +

S14 +

S15 + b
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The hypothesis of THEP to dry up FSRP was tested as a function of illiteracy
(S13), ERs (S14), and religious extremism (S15) of BH foot soldiers. An analysis of
variance was conducted to test if the model was significantly better in predicting outcome
than the mean of descriptive statistics. In Table 20, correlation of S12 with S13 at (r =
.287, p = .004), S12 with S14 (r = .404, p < .001), and for S12 with S15 (r = .181, p =
.047), were significant at p < .05. The contribution of ER to power of THEP to dry up
FSRP was moderately higher (.404) than those of S13 (illiteracy) and S15 (religious
extremism), in the model. Overall, the model, Table 21 gives (r = .452, p <.001) very
significant correlations of S12 and predictors, accounted for 20.4% (r = .204) variation in
the outcome (S12). Correlation coefficient of .452 was high.
Compared to the mean, Table 22, this model was significant (F3, 82), p < .001 to
predict outcome. Durbin-Watson = 1.61 was close to 2; this means independent
predictors. The positive values of b-coefficients (.131, .325, .178) indicated positive
relationships of the predictors, Table 23. The tolerance-values ˃ 0.1, and 1<VIF < 10,
mean no multicollinearity.
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Table 21
Correlations: DV3 = Dry Up Foot Soldier Recruitment Pool (S12)
Variable

S12

Pearson
Correlation R

Sig. (1-tailed)

S12
S13

1.000
.287

S14
S15
S12
S13
S14
S15

.404
.181
.
.004
.000
.047

S13
.287
1.00
0
.478
.053
.004
.
.000
.314

S14

S15

.404
.478

.181
.007

1.000
.007
.000
.000

.007
1.000
.047
.314
.474
.

.
.474

Table 22
R Square and Change Statistics
Model

1

R

.452
a

R2

.2
04

Adj R2

.175

SE

1.002

R2
Change
.204

Sig. F
Change
.000

Note. a. Predictors: (Constant), S15, S14, S13. b. Dependent Variable: S12

DurbinWatson
1.610
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Table 23
Test of Significance to Predict Outcome compared to Mean
Model

Sum of
df
Mean
F
Sig.
Squares
Square
1
Regression
21.143
3
7.048
7.018 .000b
Residual
82.346
82 1.004
Total
103.488 85
Note a. Dependent Variable: S12. b. Predictors: (Constant), S15, S14, S13
Table 24

Parameters of the Model (Coefficientsa); a. Dependent Variable: S12
Model

Unstd Coef

Std

t

Sig.

95.0% CI B

Collinearity

LB

UB

Tolerance

VIF

Coef

1

B

Std. Error

(Const)

1.279

.571

S13

.131

.133

S14

.352

S15

.178

Beta
2.241

.028

.144

2.414

.110

.980

.330

-.135

.396

.769

1.301

.113

.350

3.120

.002

.127

.576

.771

1.297

.101

.173

1.754

.083

.024

.380

.997

1.003

Regression 5 (Forced Entry)
Overall, the test was significant (p<.05 at p = .001), so I rejected the null
hypothesis.
Equation 17
NBHR-THEP = DV1 = S10 =

S6 +

S8 +

S9 +

S13 +

S14 +

S15 + bo

A forced entry ANOVA showed correlations of all factors to NBHR. Outcome
S10 was measured (in survey) as the power of THEP to NBHR. It was calculated that
power of THEP was (66.25%) based on mean value 3.65. The effect of each predictor
variable was shown in the forced entry regression analysis. The model accounted for
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about 24.4% of outcome (r2 = .244), and was significant F(6, 79), P = .001. It explained
24.4% of variation in the outcome. Regression analysis allows for cross-validation of the
model with R’s, R2 and adjusted R2-values, to assess if and how much the study model
represented the entire population (Nigeria) in this case. Although it may be argued that
the results of this survey study may not effectively predict the perception of the entirety
of Nigerian population, because of the (stratified) though random sample, they
represented reliable perception of a sample field more knowledgeable of the subject
matter than random street sampling of citizens, hence the validity of the methodology
here. The limitations were moderate.
On correlation, one unit increase in THEP to neutralize BH was .320 increase in
reducing FSRP (significant, p = .001); .052 decrease in political conspiracy (IH, S9) not
significant at p = .317 and negative slope b-value = -.247; and .274 increase in economic
realities (S14) significant at p = .005. B-values except for S9 increased with increase in
THEP. S10 significantly correlated only with S8, S13, and S14. Significant correlations
were noted. Beside S8 (low quality education) all confidence intervals ranges included
zero and negatives. The test showed 1.2≤VIF<2, and 0.1<Tolerance <1, which means no
multicollinearity.
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Table 25
Correlations: Supplemental Data
Variable
Pearson
Correlation

S10
S6
S8
S9

Sig. (1tailed)

S13
S14
S15
S10
S6
S8
S9
S13
S14
S15

S10
1.00
0
.069
.306
.052
.320
.274
.101
.
.265
.002
.317
.001
.005
.177

S6
.069

S8
.306

S9
-.052

S13
.320

S14
.274

S15
.101

1.000
.129
.224

.129
1.000
.381

.224
.381
1.000

.079
.094
.098

.211
-.033
-.019

.279
.373
.468

.079
.211
.279
.265
.
.118
.019
.233
.025
.005

.094
-.033
.373
.002
.118
.
.000
.193
.380
.000

.098
-.019
.468
.317
.019
.000
.
.185
.431
.000

1.000
.503
.094
.001
.233
.193
.185
.
.000
.195

.503
1.000
.018
.005
.025
.380
.431
.000
.
.435

.094
.018
1.000
.177
.005
.000
.000
.195
.435
.
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Table 26
Model Summaryb R Square
Model

R

R

Adj R

Std. Error

Squa

Square

of the

R

F

d

df

Sig. F

Estimate

Square

Change

f

2

Chang

re

Durbin-Watson

Change
1

.494a

.244

.186

.987

Note. a. Predictors: (Constant), S15, S14, S6, S8, S13, S9
b. Dependent Variable: S10

.244

1
4.247

6

e
79

.001
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Figure 4. Regression standardized residual.

Figure 5. Observed cum prob.
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The histogram and probability-probability or P-P plots with values on the diagonal
provided more illustration of the normal distribution. The observed probability appeared
to be directly proportional to the expected or the hypothetical probability of the model
S10.

Figure 6. Regression standardized predicted value.
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Figure 7. Partial regression plot: DV S10.

Figure 8. Partial regression plot: DV S10.
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Figure 9. Partial regression plot: DV S10.

The negative slope of S10 against S9 was -.247, and it was illustrated in the plot above.
The increase in THEP to NBHR is proportional to the decrease of the IH.
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Figure 10. Partial regression plot. DV S10.

Figure 11. Partial regression plot. DV S10.
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Positive slopes imply economic realities of insurgents improve with increase in
THEP on NBHR over time.

Figure 12. Partial regression plot DV S10.
Negligible outliers were observed between -2 and 2 values. The assumption of
normality was tested and verified by the scatter plot for outcome S10, predicted values,
and residuals. The partial regression plots between the outcome S10 and predictors held
the same for normality of data distribution, as in the plots above. These tests helped to
validate methodology and findings.
The partial plots (scatterplots) provided slopes that were the coefficients of the
predictor variables (b-values), informed on any nonlinear relationships between outcome
and predictor variables and detected collinearity. The variances were mostly equally
spaced out at all levels around the slope fits of scatterplots with negligible outliers (one or
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two). The plots held true for homoscedasticity, so residuals at each level of the predictor
had fairly the same variance. This observation was seen in all the following partial
regression plots.
Multiple Regression 6: MANCOVA
A hierarchical multiple regression test of covariance was conducted to study the
contributions of IV predictors to THEP in NBHR in Nigeria. The overall test was
significant at p < .05 (p = .026, p = .002) for S10 and S12, respectively in the
MANCOVA, so the null hypothesis was voided. The box’s test was nonsignificant at (p =
.576) meaning the assumption of homogeneity was met but multivariate normality was
uncertain. The effects were significant for S14 (p = .016) and S13 (p = .021) for Roy’s
largest roots test, but S9, S15 were nonsignificant. The positive values of η² (0≤η²≤1)
indicated positive effects or contributions to the outcome variables S10 and S12, which
agreed with the findings of ANOVA models for the predictor variables on the test.
Levene’s test was nonsignificant (p ˃ .05), so the assumption of homogeneity was met.
There was no significant difference between predictors contributions to the outcome
except for S14 to S12 (p = .004) which was significant (p < .05). η²<1 for all; means
homogeneity test was met, and effect sizes were positive and significant in S14 to S12 (p
=.004).
The contributions of predictors to joint variable outcome factors S10 and S12
reflected the measure of their positive effects on THEP (S10) direct measure from survey.
THEP (S12), a measure of the effects to dry up FSRP, was the same as NBHR. The tables
below represent SPSS outputs.
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Table 27
Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matricesa
Box's M
F
df1
df2
Sig.

8.325
.843
9
2514.678
.576

Table 28
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa
Variable

F

df1

df2

Sig.

S10

1.094

4

S12

1.356

4

79
79

.366
.257

a. Note. Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable
is equal across groups. Design: Intercept + S9 + S14 + S15 + S13

In Levene’s test if p ≥ .05, it means normal distribution.
I tested the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the DVs were equal
across groups. a. Design: Intercept + S9 + S14 + S15 + S13.
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Table 29
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source

Depende

Type III

nt

Sum of

Variable

Squares

df

Mean

F

Sig.

Square

Partial

Noncent.

Observed

Eta

Parameter

Powerc

Squar
ed

Corrected

S10

18.257

a

7

2.608

2.438

.026

.183

17.067

.838

b

7

3.612

3.533

.002

.246

24.732

.957

Model

S12

25.286

Intercept

S10

17.199

1

17.199

16.078

.000

.175

16.078

.977

S12

9.562

1

9.562

9.352

.003

.110

9.352

.855

S10

1.910

1

1.910

1.786

.185

.023

1.786

.261

S12

.818

1

.818

.800

.374

.010

.800

.143

S10

2.291

1

2.291

2.142

.147

.027

2.142

.304

S12

9.023

1

9.023

8.825

.004

.104

8.825

.835

S10

2.138

1

2.138

1.999

.162

.026

1.999

.287

S12

3.530

1

3.530

3.452

.067

.043

3.452

.450

S10

8.463

4

2.116

1.978

.106

.094

7.911

.569

S12

3.372

4

.843

.824

.514

.042

3.298

.252

S10

81.302

76

1.070

S12

77.702

76

1.022

S10

1207.000

84

S12

1125.000

84

Corrected

S10

99.560

83

Total

S12

102.988

83

S9

S14

S15

S13

Error

Total

a. R Squared = .183 (Adjusted R Squared = .108)
b. R Squared = .246 (Adjusted R Squared = .176)
c. Computed using alpha = .05

Regression 7
A hierarchical regression was conducted to find the power (effect) of THEP based
on drying up the BH FSRP, the IV, and the measure of the end of insurgency based on
end or 0 FSRP (S6). The correlation showed that for every unit of FSRP there was a
0.271 THEP effect, significant at p < .05. It accounted for 7.3% (R2 = .073, p = .009)
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variability in the outcome. The independence test was met at (1.89≤Durbin-Watson< 2),
at p < .05. From ANOVA the table F(1, 89) = 7.058, at p<.05 is significant, the model
was good in predicting the outcome (p = .009). Equal variance proportions (VP) of (.02 =
.02, .98 = .98) underscored no heteroscedasticity. Tolerance = 1, and VIF = 1, and 98%
VP on 4.6% eigenvalue, means there was no multicollinearity, as shown in the
coefficients and collinearity diagnostics tables below. Other factors of the variation were
unknown.
This model was significant enough but not sufficient to measure the outcome, a
zero FSRP, which was congruent to the measure of NBHR as a function of THEP. The
effect size was .271, or about 27.1% power.
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Table 30
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

S6
S12

4.09
3.51

Std.
Deviation
.996
1.109

N
91
91

Table 31
Correlations
Variable
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N

S6
S12
S6
S12
S6
S12

S6
1.000
.271
.
.005
91
91

S12
.271
1.000
.005
.
91
91
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Model is
slightly skewed
left.

Figure 13. Histogram DV S6.
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Figure 14. Normal P-P plot of regression standardized residual DV S6.
Summary
About 95 participants were randomly selected and surveyed. The descriptive
statistics of the ordinal data collected were analyzed based on means of their categorical
responses to outcome and predictor questions. Participants’ perceptions indicated positive
relationships for all predictors (IVs) to the outcome (NBHR, DV). Analyses of all
regression models voided all the null hypotheses and showed significant effects of the
predictors on the outcome variables. About 70% of the variations in the outcomes were
not explained by the significant contributions of the predictors to the outcome. That
pointed to the limitations of the models, and particularly of THEP, the hypothetical main
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predictor of the study to completely do NBHR. It appeared THEP was necessary, based
on the results, but not sufficient to completely neutralize the resurgence.
Based on survey responses of participants, and by averaging of THEPNBHR and
THEPFSRP means, up to 64.25% of participants on range of 1 to 5 (1 = strongly disagree,
and 5 = strongly agree), or 66.25% of participants using the mean of THEPNBHR, agreed
that THEP will NBHR over time. This was the hypothetical power of THEP. Not much
power can be assigned to analytical result of ordinal data. The best characterization of the
power results was based on the perception of the participants and could not be
generalized.
By design, questionnaire items (S10 – S15) addressed the six research questions,
so that participants’ responses were measures of how predictors were related to the
outcomes. On the tests of hypotheses, four of the seven regression ANOVA models were
notable, Numbers 2, 4, 5, and 7. Regression 2 showed .516 correlation of drying up FSRP
with THEPNBHR, and it accounted for 27% of the variation in outcome. Regression 4
showed a .452 correlation of factors of illiteracy, ERs, and religious extremism with
THEPFSRP. It accounted for 20.4% of variation. Regression 5 (forced entry) showed .494
correlation of factors, of zero-FSRP, for level/type/quality of education, political
conspiracy, illiteracy, ERs, and religious extremism, with THEPNBHR. It accounted for
24.4% of the variation. Regression 7 showed only .271 correlation of THEPFSRP with
zero-FSRP outcome, and it accounted for only 7.3% of the variation. All four models
were significant at (p < .05). The four models met all assumptions, as illustrated by
normal residual histograms, and p-p plot alignment in the diagonal.
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By this methodology, based on the frequency distributions in the descriptive
statistics (by SPSS), here was exactly how the participants agreed:
For RQ1/H11: THEP is related to NBHR. About 26.9% of surveyed participants
strongly agreed; 29% agreed, and 29% partly agreed.
For RQ2/H12: free-THEP was related to NBHR. About 20.7% of surveyed
participants strongly agreed; 32.6% agreed, and 30.4% partly agreed.
For RQ3/H13: THEP was related to drying up BH (FSRP). About 23.9% of
surveyed participants strongly agreed; 22.8% agreed, and 34.8% partly agreed.
For RQ4/H14: BH insurgency recruitment (FSRP) might be related to the level of
Western education attained by its foot soldiers (Illiteracy factor). About 11.6% of
participants surveyed strongly agreed; 37.9% agreed, and 37.9% partly agreed.
For RQ5/H15: Employment status (ERs factor) was related to the BH-FSRP.
About 10.6% of participants strongly agreed; 22.3% agreed, and 35.1% partly agreed.
For RQ6/H16: BH-FSRP was related to Islamic fundamentalism and
radicalization. About 25.6% of participants strongly agreed, 42.2% agreed, and 18.9%
partly agreed.
Responses were scaled from lowest point (1) to highest point (5) as follows:
Strongly disagree (1); Disagree (2); Partly Agree (3); Agree (4); and Strongly Agree (5).
The fifth research question RQ5 (Survey Item S14) was the question on if
sustenance of the foot soldiers is more related to the ERs than to the type of (Qua’anic,
Almajiri, Madrassah) education of the recruits. It had the lowest distribution mean, 3.03,
highest percent of strongly disagree and the lowest percent of strongly agree among
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participants. This result and those of the other five hypotheses supported the conceptual
framework of this study–to focus on ideological impetus fueling fundamentalism and
radicalization (Islamic religious extremism) in Nigeria as a byproduct of
illiteracy/ignorance, borne of none, or type and level of nonholistic education policy.
Nigerian education data and these results showed the significance of THEP.
The estimation of the power of THEP shall not be limited to the simple statistical
means, because the results of the analysis of variances (ANOVA), for example
Regression 5 (forced entry) showed the model was significant at p <.05, (p = .001) to
predict outcome (S10). Even MANCOVA for outcome of the combined variation (S10 +
S12), Regression 6 was significant at p < .05 (p = .026 & p = .002), which means there
were 2.6% and 0.2% slim chances respectively that the null hypothesis was true,
compared to just .1% or less chance for the ANOVA results. The model for Regression 4
was significant and better for predicting outcome at (p = .000). The ANCOVA model,
Regression 3 at (p ˃ .05), was not significant. The Regression 7 model for Zero-FSRP
ANOVA although significant at p < .05 (p = .009), was not significantly better than
simple mean, to predict the outcome.
In Chapter 5, I present a discussion of the findings.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
Insurgency, more especially resurgence, does not operate effectively without foot
soldiers, the fighters, suicide bombers, and the local and global collaborators (Cook,
2011; Shaffer, 2016; Taiwo, 2013). If militarily checkmated, they will dissipate and
infiltrate the society, temporarily or technically defeated but only to resurge, as is the case
for Nigerian (Gilbert, 2014; Karmon, 2014; Pham, 2012; Solomon, 2012), if the impetus
driving the insurgency still persisted (Animasaun & Saka, 2013; Gilpin & Giroux, 2014;
Gaffey, 2016;). By targeting those root causes earlier, with an ideological, behavior and
attitude-changing COIN as this study postulated, the THEP, the FSRP would run dry over
time (Isiaka, 2015). In this study, I used evidence-based data and analytics to find the
relationship of the power of targeted holistic education policy to neutralizing BH
resurgence in Nigeria.
A total of 95 of about 100 completed and returned survey instruments were used.
A pilot survey of 26 participants was completed months prior to final study survey. By
using the SPSS computer software to analyze the primary data, I found in the descriptive
and subsequent regression statistical analytics (ANOVA, ANCOVA, and MANCOVA),
positive relationships between the outcome (NBHR) and key predictor variables (THEP,
FSRP, and covariates).
At least 72% of the Nigerians surveyed agreed that BH should end insurgency and
integrate into the secular Nigerian society. In addition, 6% said no and 22% did not
respond. About 85% of 93 respondents mostly agreed (of which 27% strongly agree, 29%
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agree, and 29% partly agree, 12% who disagreed, and 3% who strongly disagreed) that
the ideological impetus (drive) of BH resurgence may be neutralized by a compulsory
THEP at the insurgency incident population, from nursery up to first degree (age 21).
This was 81.5% for THEPFSRP. Over 83% (averaging 85% and 81.5%) of participants
mostly agreed that THEP will neutralize BH resurgence over time. This resulted in a
probability based on the average of means, 64.25% likelihood of THEP neutralizing BH
resurgence or drying up FSRP. My findings did not represent the estimated power of
THEP in the hypothesis to NBHR over time. The THEP may begin to contribute up to
about 20% to 64.25% working with other COIN variables towards NBHR, based on the
effect sizes from the regression analyses and statistical means average. Education is an
effective tool for behavior transformation.
Discussion and Interpretation of Findings
BH insurgency or resurgence phenomenon in Nigeria indicates a hard-to-measure
human behavior, attributable to a complex mixture of composite variables including
history, education, economics, religion, sectarian indoctrination, ethnicity, politics, public
policy, hegemony, state of mind, communication, and the environment (Bernahu, 2016).
It takes generations to neutralize an ideologically driven insurgency (Alkhouri, 2014;
Auld, 2015; Farrall, 2015; Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015). From the results of the
statistical analyses of the power of THEP, it may take a long time (may be at least 2
cycles of kindergarten to college) to effectively neutralize known ideological impetus
driving BH resurgence in Nigeria. The THEP’s contribution will be steady, maybe from
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immediate 20% to 64.25% going by regression (effect sizes) and probability ratio of
simple statistical means.
Although it correlated positively with THEP and other predictor variables, I found
that respondents’ view of the ERs of the insurgents (poverty and unemployment) was
lowest on the scale among the concerns or root causes of the BH insurgency. Scholars are
divided on this (Carson, 2012; Edet, 2015). Others (Adenrele, 2012; Alozieuwa, 2012;
Cook, 2011; David et al. (2015); Forest, 2012; Sulemana, 2014) listed other factors. The
same time IH was negative with THEP in this study as ER. An increase in illiteracy and
IH reflects some decrease in economic progress and quality or holistic education
(Flannery, 2015; Forbes, 1996). ER had most significant correlation with illiteracy factor,
which means that illiteracy may be the highest cause of unemployment and poverty, as
literature acknowledges (Ajetumobi, 2013; Fowoyo, 2013).
In line with the majority of literature, the participants confirmed that the root
cause of insurgency may be low quality or type of education (Qur’anic) and no formal
education of the insurgent foot soldiers. This was followed closely by the factor of
ignorance and religious intolerance, tailoring the belief of the (patriarchal) insurgency
that Western education is sin. This finding was in alignment with Soyinka (2012) and
Quranic arbitration solution to insurgency by confronting their ignorance and illiteracy.
All of the directional hypotheses were upheld, and all the null hypotheses were voided in
the tests. At a confidence interval of 95%, effect sizes, and between-subjects (variable-tovariable/covariates) data analyses have supported the findings.
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The incremental nature of behavior change is supported by literature (Crowling,
2011; Csikszentmihalyi, 2014; Drew, 1988; Forbes & Martin, 2004; Lutz, 2014),
counteractive to the radicalization and insurgency interactivity through rumination of
frustration, which leads to aggression (Richardson et al., 1994; Berkowitz, 1969;
Bushman, 2002; Csikszentmihalyi, 2014; Dollard et al., 1939). The conceptual
framework of this study was supported by the findings. The proportionality of the
numbers on mean values to effect sizes of predictor variables on the regression
probability plots will require more studies. The variables were IH (political conspiracy),
illiteracy, ERs (poverty and unemployment), and religious extremism, and their
correlation levels with THEP as a measure of neutralizing BH resurgence (NBHR), or
drying up of FSRP were shown in the regression analyses. This study extended the
subject in the social science literature, because of new statistical evidence of how the
Nigerian participants thought about BH and holistic education in 2018. The numbers
(effect sizes) showed levels of relationships of factors in the study and projected how
much holistic education policy may help to neutralize BH resurgence. Policymakers may
use the quantitative results to inspire further investigation for implications to social
change.
The effect sizes of predictors were moderate. Variations of the variances at all
residual levels were not explainable in the analyses/findings of the models, and not even
by many normal and post hoc hypothesis tests. However, the assumptions of normal
distribution and the independence of predictors, homogeneity of variance and regression
slopes, absence of skewness and kurtosis, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity of
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residuals were met. The results reflect data validity and attest to the reliability of the
analyses and findings.
The literature on qualitative studies has increased, more than for quantitative
studies on BH. The continuing resurgence has aggravated social, political, religious, and
economic troubles for Nigeria and neighbors. Military COIN success was limited and
often reversed by resurgence. Governments scrambled searching for lasting solution with
many recommendations and little evidence-based data on BH. The data and conclusion
from this study may fill some gaps, although 70% of the variations in THEP on NBHR
were not explained. This means further studies are necessary.
THEP (a factor of ultimacy), when combined with other COIN activities, would
ultimately neutralize the components that feed the impetus driving resurgence. THEP
may account for 20% to 64.25% based on the findings of this study, for positive social
change.
Limitations of the Study
The military COIN in Nigeria may temporarily defeat BH, but it has not
neutralized the resurgence. BH insurgency is a socioreligious, ideologically inspired, and
driven phenomenon. The effectiveness of the military COIN is necessary and was
assumed to create the shield for the THEP program to operate. This assumption limits the
study because it has not been factored into the survey questionnaire and regression
analysis in estimating the power of THEP to NBHR, and it may account for significant
part of the 70% unexplained variations of the regression results. THEP is necessary but
not sufficient.
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Although the statistical assumptions for the models were met, the assumption of a
well designed and implemented THEP in Nigeria is an uncertainty difficult to test for this
study. This limits any claims of the findings. The hypothesis is limited by what can
actually happen with Nigeria. The data collection, treatment, and analysis were done
carefully. However, the designs of the regression models were experimental because
there was no previous study to follow. I tested combinations of predictor variables that
may best predict the outcome. I may have missed some critical factor or details in design
that fill the apparent gaps or explains portions of the 70% unknown variations. Results of
between-subjects variations call for more studies because many variables correlated at or
close to large effects (r = .5) range. The answers to the six research questions came by
analysis of the descriptive statistics, but survey of participants’ perceptions was not the
best scientific study to find the power of THEP to NBHR. I think the survey instruments
could be designed sharper to measure the variables. This study has been a learning
experience for me. The study was theoretical, and practical realities limit results.
Although the trajectory of BH resurgence currently models a well-behaved
phenomenon, because its identity and modus operandi have been under study by the
scholarly community, the dynamics of border porosity (Onuoha, 2013) at the
international boundaries and the vortex in the Sahelian region complicate the
mathematics of modeling the BH resurgence. BH insurgency has regionalized,
internationalized, and linked with global terrorism and insurgency. The nomadic Fulani
Herdsmen were not factored; they are hard to target, and may constitute elements of the
BH insurgency. It will take a settled community to plan and implement a THEP. This
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study may not be extrapolated, but be started off with the IDPs in their secured camps
outside the current unpredictable territories in Northeast Nigeria. The results of this study
are more descriptive than prescriptive. Other excluded factors in the study include the
impact of climate change in the pastoral Sahelian settlements, the rigid patriarchal
traditions of the ethnic peoples of the Sahel, and the neutralization of BH resurgence.
Recommendations
Following the pilot study of participants from Northern Nigeria regions, it became
clear that people of the Islamic faith were not well represented. The final study relocated
to Abuja, the center to increase representation in the sample. The study calls for efforts
necessary to adequately include people of the Islamic faith. The results of a larger and
more representative sample will be more suited for generalization. Alternatively, studies
may be compartmentalized to various groups or regions in Nigeria and neighbors affected
by BH, and the findings will be integrated to find answers. The phenomenon of Fulani
herdsmen migrations and their nomadic activities need to be studied because BH is
reported to be embedded or are following their trails downward toward the Atlantic,
attacking and dislodging other ethnic peoples in their ancestral homes, allegedly in search
of new pastoral lands and water because of climate the change effects.
The data collected for this study may deserve further cleaning or analysis as a
secondary data to other pertinent studies. Although the six research questions for this
study were answered, learning from the data was not exhausted. The education/training of
the insurgents, before, and during the insurgency needs to be studied. If they were the
illiterate at recruitment, what have they learned since enlistment to sustain the extreme
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challenges of the insurgency? That informs any deradicalization or IDDRS program that
may interphase with THEP implementation. It is critical to properly rehabilitate and
reintegrate the insurgents, so they do not infiltrate the larger population to infest it. How
to normalize the radicalized insurgents’ group along the incident population in Nigeria
while delivering THEP? That calls for a more far-reaching study than this.
This study did not survey the insurgents for the extreme risk and difficulty. A
study that actually interacts with, interviews, or surveys the insurgents is essential to
better understand if the BH insurgents will be open to participate in a rehabilitation that
includes components of Western education which they ideologically rejected as sin
(Haram).
How can the unexposed population of southern Nigeria be shielded to prevent the
spread and infiltration of the insurgency that seeks to Islamize Nigeria by force?
About 70% power to NBHR beside THEP was unexplained, a subject for further
studies. These recommended for further studies are related to NBHR.
Implications: For Positive Social Change
In the study, I surveyed a group deemed knowledgeable of the subject matter and
who lived and worked in education at a city threatened by more attacks from BH. I
shared the framework of the study with participants in writing. Their informed opinion or
perception was the data and it conferred validity. Social activists, scholars, practitioners,
and policymakers may want to learn of the results and possibly reference them as limited
as they may be for policymaking and further study considerations. The study proffered
the power of THEP to NBHR and at the same time empowering other Nigerian
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population and the workforce for higher economic prosperity. In the study about 84% of
participants agreed that the insurgents are the ignorant, intolerant Muslim perverts; about
87% agreed that the insurgency cannot continue without the foot soldiers; and 78%
believed the foot soldiers were predominantly the illiterates with unemployable skills. In
addition, 85% blamed ignorance, intolerance, and radicalization on the low quality or
type of education, and 72% believed that the insurgency was driven by IH, a type of
political conspiracy. I found that 85% agreed on THEP to NBHR. One reason Western
Nigeria high Islamic population is not radicalized is its love for ordinary Western
education (NBS, 2014).
Nigeria and neighbors were traumatized by the scourge of BH insurgency. Over
2.6 million IDPs became unproductive and dependent, unable to go back to their
ancestral homes. It means that the end of BH resurgence (the fourth deadliest terror group
in the world) will bring back liveliness, an end to the hopelessness of IDPs in the entire
northeastern Nigeria and perhaps the neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.
Assuming that the calculated power of THEP to NBHR at 20% to 64.25% over
time is attainable, then a better education, more productive workforce, and transformation
of ERs means replacing the economic disaster, starvation, poverty, public health disaster,
and the political instability in the Northeastern Nigeria, with the advantages of THEP.
The new paradigm (educated and tolerant society) is a positive tool for economically
strong and peaceful society, in a competitive global economy. The insurgency in the
neighboring Cameroun, Chad, Niger, and Mali will be impacted. Nigeria ceases to be a
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vassal for BH. Global links with Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorism network will become
unattractive compared to the benefits of THEP.
The death toll due to the insurgency has continued to go up from over 26,000 in
2016 and the destruction of properties worth hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars since
2009 when BH activities exploded in Nigerian will come under control if the resurgence
was neutralized. Children will live and grow in the holistic schools and playgrounds, and
they will receive relevant education that is transforming their life and future, compared to
the hopeless cycle of death, displacement and sufferings, in danger of the BH attacks
inside and outside the IDP camps.
Implications for Methodology, Theory, and Empiricism
The cross-sectional survey method used in this study was effective. For the
validity of data and reliability of the inferential conclusions, the design of this study
defined the unit of analysis (measured outcome) and a framework grounded in theory
(Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 2018). Randomization of the sample was ensured by choice
of sample field to enhance validity of data. Because direct contact with the insurgents
was difficult, the effects (the impacts of their activities) were indirectly modeled and
measured. The framework (ruminated frustration-aggression, behavior change by
education) of the study allowed transitive determination of causality. The design of
survey instrument evaluated the unit of analysis, the dependent outcome variable, by
measuring the IVs. The survey instrument measured the outcome and the predictor
variables causing it. The hypothesis tests of assumptions, if not properly interpreted for
the null hypothesis, become scientifically invalid. The transitive paradigm simply states
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that if a = b, and b = c, then a = c. Insurgency (c) is measured by its impetus and its
effects (b), as in this design. Because the study was based on the primary data, the design
of various regression models (7) needed to be sorted and analyzed in tests of hypotheses
to compare and study the variable effects and the validity of the assumptions before any
reliable conclusion could be reached. In a subsequent study, this learning will inform and
improve design. Social sciences use more ordinal data, than pure sciences’ ratio.
The empirical numbers in this study were not precise and are subject to further
studies. The statistical outputs by SPSS were more representative when several models
had been tested than a single test without the effort to cross-validate. I analyzed over
seven trial regression models to understand the trend of data. This is recommended,
especially if the study is more original than regular. My further studies will look for
sharper instrument, based on the findings of this effort.
Conclusion
Based on the analyses of the descriptive statistics and several regression models,
about 85% of the participants agreed BH resurgence may be neutralized by a compulsory
THEP; from elementary to the college (age 21), free or not free. THEP was related to
NBHR and to drying up FSRP, but the effectiveness (power) of THEP may only range
between 20% and 64.25%, based on the statistical average of means and effect sizes, over
time, assuming other factors causing the variation were operational. THEP may be
necessary to NBHR, but is not sufficient.
For survey participants, up to 81.5% partly/mostly agreed free THEP will
eventually dry up FSRP, in places vulnerable to Islamic radicalization. Up to 87.4%
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partly/mostly agreed that the sustenance of FSRP of BH insurgency was highly related to
the type, level, and quality of education attained by recruits. Up to 69% disagreed/partly
agreed the sustenance of foot soldier recruitment pools; FSRP of BH is more related to
ERs than to type of (Qur’anic, Almajiri, Madrassah) education of the recruits. Up to 78%
mostly agreed that the sustenance of FSRP of BH insurgency was more related to the
Islamic fundamentalism and radicalization. The survey participants mostly believed that
illiteracy, ignorance, and religious ideological ethos were the greater impetus driving BH
resurgence, than the economic realities of the insurgents. This conclusion was grounded
in literature and helped to clarify the levels of relationships.
I found that the power (effect) of THEP to neutralizing the BH resurgence in
Nigeria may be as high as 64.25% for a policy cycle once fully implemented and other
COIN factors causing variation operational. A cycle may range from 0 to 15 or 16 years,
kindergarten through college (age 21). Going by Integrated Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), norm-setting takes time (Muggah
& O’Donnell, 2015), perhaps so long that practitioners and politicians may not find
THEP immediately attractive. It takes generations to deradicalize insurgents (Alkhouri,
2014; Auld, 2015; Farrall, 2015; Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015). The conclusion is
supported by literature, but the power estimate was based on the statistical means average
of survey participant responses, which is hard to generalize.
THEP was positively correlated to both NBHR and drying up FSRP of BH. The
correlation values for the predictor variables and covariates will be scientific proofs that
over a period of time THEP would help to neutralize the resurgence of BH, and or to dry
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up the recruitment pools of BH foot soldiers. Based on the analyses of the predictors’
effects by mean scores, ERs had the least effect (50.8%) of the impetuses contributing to
the BH insurgency in Nigeria, the highest being the quality and type of education
(Qur’anic or other, up to 80%), followed by Islamist ideology (the SR or the IH, 72%), by
the same method that estimated THEP power 66.25%, and average of THEPNBHR &
THEPFSRP, up to 64.25% to neutralizing the resurgence of BH (NBHR).
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Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire
Neutralizing BH Resurgency: A PhD Research Survey-Questionnaire (Anonymous)
Resurgency is where an insurgency keeps coming back after apparent defeat. Assume government will
compel all children in areas vulnerable to Islamist radicalization to be in school free, from nursery up to
first degree (age 21). Schools shall teach holistic curriculum (academic, spiritual, vocational, global-view,
peaceful coexistence with other faiths) leading to employable skills. On this premise please answer ALL,
honestly. Indicate your answer.

A. Should Boko Haram end the insurgency and live peaceably in a secular Nigeria,
accept equal rights, freedom of movement, assembly, and practice for others of their
own beliefs?
Yes
No
B. Have you earned at least a bachelor plus 5 years of experience or master’s degree?
Yes
No
Read Through first, then Circle (highlight) only the response that truly describes how
you agree with each statement about Boko Haram (BH) insurgency (1 = strongly
disagree up to 5 = strongly agree).
1. Boko Haram (BH) insurgency generally believes Western education is sin (for
Muslims).
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

2. BH insurgency spokespersons (like Kabiru Sokoto and Abu Qaqa, 2012) argued it
is the anti-Islamic civilization/culture condoned by Western education that is sin
(for Muslims)
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

3. BH Islamist insurgents are a devoted Muslim sect who would Islamize Nigeria
(by force)
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

4. BH insurgents are ignorant, intolerant Muslims who simply pervert the Islamic
religion
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

5. BH insurgency is mainly a jihad (violent struggle) against the perversion of the
Islamic Sharia laws and culture by Western civilization, secular governments, and
society.
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

174
6. BH insurgency cannot be sustained without the foot soldiers (fighters, suicide
bombers).
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

7. BH insurgency foot soldiers are predominantly the illiterates with unemployable
skills.
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

8. The low quality or type of education (Qur’anic or other), or no formal education
of BH insurgents mostly contribute to ignorance, intolerance, and radicalization
(extremism).
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

9. BH insurgency is mostly driven by Islamist ideology, Sharia Rule (or Islamic
hegemony) despite their economic poverty, angst against corruption; and the
political conspiracies.
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

10. The ideological impetus (drive) of BH resurgency may be neutralized by a
compulsory targeted holistic education policy at the insurgency incident
population, from nursery up to first degree (age 21), that teaches quality holistic
curriculum and competency in various employable skills, peace, global worldview
and tolerance of other peoples and faiths. Q1
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

11. The ideological impetus (drive) of BH resurgency may be neutralized by a
compulsory free targeted holistic education policy at the insurgency incident
population, from nursery up to first degree (age 21), that teaches quality holistic
curriculum and competency in various employable skills, peace, global worldview
and tolerance of other peoples and faiths. Q2
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

12. A free targeted holistic education policy in places vulnerable to Islamic
radicalization will eventually dry up the foot soldier recruitment pools of the BH
insurgency. (Q3)
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree
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13. Sustenance of foot soldier recruitment pools of BH insurgency is highly related to
the type, level, and quality of education attained by recruits. (Q4)
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

14. Sustenance of foot soldier recruitment pools of BH is more related to economic
realities than to type of (Qur’anic, Almajiri, Madrassah) education of the recruits.
(Q5)
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

15. Sustenance of foot soldier recruitment pools of BH insurgency is more related to
the Islamic fundamentalism and radicalization. (Q6)
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
partly agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

C. You belong in this old political region of Nigeria 1. East 2. West 3. North 4.
Middle Belt
D. Thank you. I trust you have responded to all items honestly and truly. Yes
No

